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ABSTRACT 
Most scholarly works on Operation Just Cause, the code name for the 1989 
invasion of Panama by the United States, have focused on the capture of General Manuel 
Noriega.  This focus ignores the complexity of U.S.-Panamanian relations and the long 
history of American citizens in Panama, however, and reinforces a puppet narrative.  
This thesis argues instead that the primary motive for Operation Just Cause was 
to protect the 35,500 American citizens at risk in Panama.  By discounting this 
population, previous works offer limited insights into the invasion.  Fully accounting for 
this large and vulnerable population makes clear that the use of military force 
represented a prudent response to a very real threat.  The removal of Noriega was merely 
the means to an end: the protection of American citizens. Political, diplomatic, and 
economic pressure did not convince Noriega, who was never a “puppet,” to step down.  
In fact, they worsened the situation for Americans and compelled the Bush 
Administration to use the only remaining option: military force. 
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CHAPTER I  
INTRODUCTION 
Early on the morning of 20 December 1989, 26,000 American soldiers 
intervened in Panama under the code-name Operation Just Cause.  It was the largest 
military operation by the United States since the Vietnam War and quickly overwhelmed 
the Panamanian Defense Forces. This military action appeared, to many, to follow a 
familiar pattern of U.S. direct military intervention in the Western Hemisphere. Under 
the pretext of establishing order, protecting American lives, or capturing a so-called 
wrongdoer, the United States conducted forty interventions between 1865 and 1930.1  
During the Cold War the United States intervened nine times, but only used military 
force in the Dominican Republic, Grenada, and Panama.2   
In the case of Operation Just Cause, the use of force appeared solely for the 
removal of General Manuel Noriega, the “Maximum Leader” and a former U.S. ally. 
Critics both in the United States and abroad condemned the action as an unjustified 
invasion. In a Washington Post editorial on 16 January 1990, Senator George McGovern 
                                                
1 Alan McPherson The Invaded: How Latin Americans and Their Allies Fought and 
Ended U.S. Occupations (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014). In Confronting the 
American Dream: Nicaragua Under U.S. Imperial Rule (Durham, NC: Duke University 
Press, 2005) Michel Gobat states there were 43 interventions. In Empire's Workshop: 
Latin America, the United States, and the Rise of the New Imperialism (New York: 
Metropolitan Books, 2006) Greg Gardin considered there to be 6,000 interventions based 
on the U.S. Navy’s recording of naval warships sent to Latin America between 1865 and 
1935.  These visits were primarily ports of call and did not involve violence. 
2 Russell Crandell, Gunboat Democracy: U.S. Interventions in the Dominican Republic, 
Grenada, and Panama (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2006), 2.   
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(D-SD) called it “a Betrayal of American Principles.”  He compared it with “Grenada in 
1983 and a dozen other twentieth-century American invasions of defenseless little 
countries to the south of us.”3  McGovern’s criticism portrayed Operation Just Cause as 
a misuse of American force against a country that did not present a legitimate threat. It 
seemed to signal a return of the big stick foreign policy of President Theodore Roosevelt 
meant to reinforce U.S. hegemony over the hemisphere, now that the Cold War was 
ending and the United States became the sole super power.   
In contrast, President George H. W. Bush justified the invasion as a means “to 
safeguard the lives of Americans, to defend democracy in Panama, to combat drug 
trafficking, and to protect the integrity of the Panama Canal Treaty.”4  The first of these 
reasons, the threat to American citizens, is often dismissed as a flimsy excuse.5  Six 
years earlier, President Ronald Reagan had justified a military intervention into Grenada 
because, “There were then about 1,000 of our citizens on Grenada” and he feared “that 
they'd be harmed or held as hostages.”6  But to the President’s embarrassment, when 
                                                
3 George McGovern, “A Betrayal of American Principles,” Washington Post, 16 January 
1989.     
4 George H. W. Bush, “Address to the Nation on Panama” (televised address, 
Wachington D.C., 20 December 1989) <http://millercenter.org/president 
/speeches/detail/3422> accessed 25 November 2011. 
5 See Louis Fischer, Presidential War Power, 3rd ed. (Lawrence: University Press of 
Kansas, 2013); John Quigley, “The Legality of the United States Invasion of Panama,” 
Yale Journal of International Law 15, (Summer 1990), 281-297; Max Hilaire, 
International Law and the United States Military Intervention in the Western 
Hemisphere (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1997).     
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U.S. Marines landed on the beaches, sunbathing Americans welcomed them, unaware of 
the supposed danger.7 Consequently, when President Bush referenced safeguarding 
American lives, critics challenged his rationale and argued that Panama represented yet 
another invasion launched under false pretenses.8   
This thesis argues the opposite.  The primary purpose for Operation Just Cause 
was indeed to protect 35,500 American citizens at risk in Panama.  By discounting the 
dangers to this population, previous works offered limited insights into the invasion and 
U.S.-Panamanian relations.  American citizens had been travelling to Panama since the 
1850s and a large-scale permanent population settled there in 1903.  Fully accounting for 
                                                                                                                                           
6 Address to the Nation on Events in Lebanon and Grenada October 27, 1983 
<https://reaganlibrary.archives.gov/archives/speeches/1983/102783b.htm> accessed 28 
April 2017. 
7 Robert D. McFadden, “From Rescued Students, Gratitude and Praise” New York Times  
October 28, 1983.  The story of sunbathing students appears apocryphal, but interviews 
with American students and faculty in the days following the invasion recounted how 
they did not feel threatened.  Kenneth Dam, Eugenia Charles, Paul Tsongas, Charles 
Modica, Bobby Inman, Sally Shelton, Seymour Weiss, interviewed by Ted Koppel, 
Nightline, ABC, October 25, 1983, <https://tvnews.vanderbilt.edu/broadcasts/656934> 
accessed 17 December 2015; Michael T. Kaufman, “50 Marines Land At Barbados 
Field,” New York Times, October 25, 1983; John T. McQuiston, “School's Chancellor 
Says Invasion Was Not Necessary To Save Lives,” New York Times, October 26, 1983; 
Albert J. Parisi, “Students Reflect On Grenada Invasion,” New York Times, November 6, 
1983.  
8 The criticisms appeared in Malcolm McConnell, Just Cause: The Real Story of 
America's High-Tech Invasion of Panama (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1991); The 
Independent Commission of Inquiry on the U.S. Invasion of Panama, The U.S. Invasion 
of Panama: The Truth Behind Operational 'Just Cause' (New York: South End Press, 
1999); Cindy Jaquith, Don Rojas, Nils Castro, and Fidel Castro, Panama: The Truth 
About the U.S. Invasion (New York: Pathfinder Press, 1990); Phillip E. Wheaton,  
Panama Invaded: Imperial Occupation Versus the Struggle for Sovereignty (Trenton, 
NJ: Red Sea Press, 1993).   
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this large and vulnerable population makes clear that the use of military force 
represented a prudent response to a very real threat.  U.S. policymakers had used 
numerous instruments of power to compel Noriega to retire.  Economic sanctions had 
failed, and only brought hardship on the Panamanian people and intensified their anger 
against American citizens.9  Democratic elections held in May 1989 seemed to offer a 
political solution, but Noriega overturned the results when his preferred candidate lost.  
Diplomatic pressure from the Organization of American States proved ineffective. 
Finally, a domestic military coup in October 1989 failed to dislodge Noriega due to poor 
planning by the plotters and a lack of U.S. support.  The harassment of American 
citizens intensified with each policy failure.  A direct intervention by the United States 
military, which the administration sought to avoid, appeared the only remaining course 
of action.10  
The need for a direct military intervention came on 16 December 1989 when 
Noriega’s soldiers killed an American service member, wounded another, and detained a 
third along with his civilian wife.  While in detention the soldiers beat the husband and 
                                                
9 Lawrence A. Yates, The U.S. Military Intervention in Panama: Origins, Planning, and 
Crisis Management, June 1987 – December 1989 (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military 
History, United States Army, 2008), 42. 
10 CIA report, “The Harassment of US Personnel in Panama: Patterns and Objectives” 
Directorate of Intelligence, March 13, 1989, Panama Files, Panama [9], OA/ID# 
CF00741-022, National Security Council, Nicholas Rostow Files, Bush Presidential 
Records, George Bush Presidential Library.  In the report the CIA warned that the 
Noriega Regime had engaged in a campaign of harassment against Americans in Panama 
as a way of pressuring Washington to limit economic sanctions and avoid using military 
force, because of the potential of Americans being taken as hostages. 
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sexually assaulted the wife.  These attacks clearly proved that American citizens were in 
great danger.  Critics condemned the Bush Administration for invading a foreign country 
and seizing the head of state after a single American death.  However, one must take into 
account that the safety of the 35,500 American citizens living in Panama could not be 
guaranteed. President Bush responded swiftly to remove Noriega by launching 
Operation Just Cause.  
The emphasis in the literature on the removal of Noriega reflects a trend in the 
historical literature on U.S.-Latin American relations during the Cold War. Part of a 
generational divide, works by scholars who lived through the Cold War take the view 
that the United States asserted political, economic and social domination over the 
Western Hemisphere.  These works present the United States as the aggressor.  Latin 
American nations are victims and the rulers were mere “puppets.”11 Challenging the 
Cold War narrative is Max Paul Friedman.  In his historiographic essay he critiqued the 
way historians have written about U.S.-Latin American relations because it is 
“representative of an approach that ascribes all agency to U.S. policy-makers, even as it 
                                                
11 Lars Schoultz Beneath the United States: A History of U. S. Policy Toward Latin 
America (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Pres 1998), 253. See also Peter H. Smith, 
Talons of the Eagle: Latin America, the United States, and the World, 4th ed. (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2012); Eduardo Galeano, Open Veins of Latin America: 
Five Centuries of the Pillage of a Continent (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1997). 
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criticizes their actions.”12  Instead, he calls for historians to “retire the puppets” by 
“restoring Latin America to the equation in terms of both agency and archives.”13  
Despite the call to “retire the puppets,” there has been resistance. Stephen Rabe 
concedes, “The United States was not omnipotent and Latin American leaders were not 
mere puppets,” but he warns “historians can go too far in denying the realities of the 
global disruption of power or the active U.S. role in fermenting chaos in the region 
during the Cold War.”14  In contrast and representative of the newer generation of 
historians is Hal Brands.  He writes that “many scholars . . . interpret the Cold War as a 
‘savage crusade,’ conducted by the United States and local reactionaries that broke 
popular movements, ravaged the Left, and eviscerated Latin American democracy.”  He 
argues this “savage crusade” view is too reductionist and instead Latin America saw a 
complex struggle between the Right and Left during the Cold War. The Left advocated 
for a revolutionary overthrow of established governments to bring about radical 
economic and political change.  The Right, in contrast, preferred conservative 
totalitarian rule through militarism.  The weak democratic governments in Latin 
America could not survive these opposed political forces.  The Cold War “fused together 
                                                
12 Max Paul Friedman, “Retiring the Puppets, Bringing Latin America Back In: Recent 
Scholarship on United States-Latin American Relations,” Diplomatic History 27: no. 5 
(November 2003), 624.  
13 Friedman, “Retiring the Puppets, Bringing Latin America Back In,” 636. 
14 Stephen G. Rabe, The Killing Zone: The United States Wages Cold War In Latin 
America, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), xl.  
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long-running clashes over social, political, and economic arrangements” and “U.S. 
power” came into conflict with “Latin American nationalism.”15  
While the debate over the puppet narrative continues, one topic regarding U.S.-
Latin American relations during the Cold War that remains overlooked is direct military 
interventions by the United States.  The majority of historians make no distinction and 
lump direct military interventions with all other interventions, from supporting a coup to 
economic pressure. For instance, Rabe and Brands both group the three Cold War 
military interventions into a broad generalized category of intervention.  They offer no 
distinction for the use of the United States military in Latin America.  
This generalization can be seen in Michael Grow’s work, U.S. Presidents and 
Latin American Interventions: Pursuing Regime Change in the Cold War.  He offers “a 
fresh interpretation of the root cause of U.S. interventionism” by arguing that each 
intervention occurred for different motives on the part of the United States.  He looks at 
Guatemala in 1954, Cuba in 1961, British Guiana in 1963, the Dominican Republic in 
1965, Chile in 1970, Nicaragua in 1981, Grenada in 1983 and finally Panama in 1989.  
Grow dismisses the previous argument that the United States intervened for either 
security or economic concerns and instead argues for “three entirely different factors — 
U.S. international credibility, U.S. domestic politics, and lobbying by Latin American 
                                                
15 Hal Brands, Latin America's Cold War (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
2010), 7.  
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and Caribbean political actors.”16 Grows reconsiders the motives of the United States, 
and the role of Latin Americans in supporting interventions.  However, he makes no 
distinction between interventions. The training of Cuban exiles for the 1961 Bay of Pigs 
invasion, the 1965 invasion of the Dominican Republic by U.S. Marines, and U.S. 
support for the 1973 coup in Chile are presented as part of a general trend of Cold War 
intervention.  Grow at least offers some analysis on direct U.S. military interventions, 
unlike other scholars.  His work complicates the standard narrative of the United States 
merely asserting its will on Latin America by making room for a Latin American 
perspective.    
In contrast, Russell Crandall distinguishes between interventions and focuses 
solely on the direct use of the U.S. military.  He argues that the direct military 
interventions in the Dominican Republic, Grenada, and Panama were conducted for 
legitimate national securities concerns.17 He questions whether the United States needed 
to intervene and says that in all three cases U.S. involvement was not required.  He 
concludes, however, that by using its military, the United States put institutions in place 
that led to democratic government.  Using statistics such as the Freedom House’s 
ranking, Crandall shows that in 2006 the three nations were ranked as free and 
functioning democracies. Crandall employs the term “Gunboat Democracy” as a play on 
Gunboat Diplomacy and argues “democracy remained strongest where the United States 
                                                
16 Michael Grow, U.S. Presidents and Latin American Interventions: Pursuing Regime 
Change in the Cold War (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2008), xi.  
17 Crandell, Gunboat Democracy, 22.  
   9 
intervened most” i.e. directly using its military.  He points out that the book does not 
“argue that American intervention…was the sole factor that led to stronger 
democracies.” Instead he calls for greater study of the countries after the intervention to 
see why these three cases ended up as stable democracies.18   
Scholarly works on the individual interventions remain limited.  There have been 
two historical monographs on the 1965 Dominican invasion, but both support the puppet 
narrative.19  There are a few operational histories on Grenada, but no scholarly works.20  
While there have been works on Panama, most reinforce the puppet narrative and do not 
consider the larger historical context of U.S.-Panamanian relations.  The long 
declassification process of U.S. government documents has limited works on Panama 
and Grenada.  Many primary sources have only recently been declassified.   
A few operational histories on Operation Just Cause have been written, but these 
are narratives of military action.21  Complementing them are articles in military journals 
                                                
18 Ibid., 227. Rabe calls the term fatuous though he does not say why nor does he engage 
Crandall’s argument. 
19 See Piero Gleijeses, The Dominican Crisis: The 1965 Constitutionalist Revolt and 
American Intervention (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978) and Eirc 
Thomas Chester, Rag-tags, Scum Riff Raff and Commies: The U.S. Intervention in the 
Dominican Republic, 1965-1966 (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2001). 
20 Ronald H. Cole, Operation Urgent Fury Grenada (Washington, D.C.: Joint History 
Office, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2013). 
21 Several works include Ronald H. Cole, Operation Just Cause: The Planning and 
Execution of Joint Operations in Panama, February 1988-January 1990 (Washington, 
D.C.: Joint History Office, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1995);  
Dolores de Mena, Operation Just Cause, Promote Liberty Supplement, Annual 
Command History, Fiscal Year (Quarry Heights PM, SOUTHCOM Historian’s office, 
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that analyze planning and tactical execution of military units during the invasion. But, 
the lessons the U.S. military has drawn from Operation Just Cause focus on the capture 
of Noriega.  They do not consider the large presence of American citizens nor any 
strategic lessons.22   
In addition to military writers, there were some works by journalists immediately 
after the invasion.  Most are concerned with Noriega and the events leading to the 
invasion.23  Political scientists and legal scholars have written on the invasion, but they 
                                                                                                                                           
1993); Delores de Mena, Soldiering in Panama (Fort Clayton, Panama: History Office, 
U.S. Army South, 1997); Nicholas E Reynolds, Just Cause: Marine Operations in 
Panama 1988-1990 (History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps. 
Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1996). 
22 Examples of these articles include “Ministry in Combat Operations,” Military 
Chaplains' Review, Summer 1990; Daniel K. Morgan, “Operation Just Cause: A Medical 
Logistics Perspective,” Air Force Journal of Logistics 14 (Summer 1990); Kevin H. 
Govern, “Sorting the Wolves From the Sheep: Enemy Prisoner of War Operations 
during Operation Just Cause.”  Military Police 4 (October 2004); Kevin J. Hammond, 
and Frank Sherman, “Sheridans in Panama.” Armor 99 (March-April 1990); Joseph E. 
DeFrancisco, “Bayonet Artillery in Operation Just Cause,” Field Artillery Journal (June 
1990). 
23 See Frederick Kempe. Divorcing the Dictator (New York: Putnam’s Sons, 1990); 
John Dinges, Our Man in Panama (New York: Random House, 1991); Richard M. 
Koster, In the Time of Tyrants (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1991).   The 
most recent works to discuss Panama include David Harris, Shooting The Moon: The 
True Story Of An American Manhunt Unlike Any Other, Ever (Boston: Little, Brown, 
2001) and Benjamin Runkle, Wanted Dead Or Alive: Manhunts from Geronimo to Bin 
Laden (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2011).  Both focus solely on capturing Noeirga.  
Harris offers a historical narrative of the indictment and the maneuvering that went into 
preparing it.  Runkle in contrast looks at Panama solely being about capturing Noriega 
and sees the invasion as part a long U.S. history of capturing individuals.  For a limited 
Panamanian perspective see Godfrey Harris and Guillermo de St. Malo A. The 
Panamanian Problem: How the Reagan and Bush Administrations Dealt with the 
Noriega Regime (Los Angeles: The Americas Group, 1993) and Juan B. Sosa, In 
Defiance: The Battle Against General Noriega Fought from Panama’s Embassy in 
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offer little historical analysis and are concerned with legal justifications for military 
action. 24 Louis Fischer, for instance, argues that the stated reasons for the invasion were 
flawed. He sees the protection of American citizens as a weak excuse that would allow 
the United States to intervene anywhere it desires.25  Most legal scholars agree with 
Fischer’s argument and portray Operation Just Cause as a violation of international 
norms.  Max Hillare says military action in Panama violated both the United Nations and 
the Organization of American States Charters.26  Yet legal scholars,  citing the same 
legal principles argue that Operation Just Cause was a lawful response and the United 
States acted according to historical norms.  Anthony D'Amato does not see the 
intervention as a violation of international law arguing that it did not violate the UN or 
OAS charter and by intervening in support of democracy it established a new 
international norm.27 
                                                                                                                                           
Washington (Washington, D.C.: The Francis Press, 1999); Luis Murrillo The Noriega 
Mess: The Drugs, the Canal, and Why America Invaded (Berkeley, California: Video 
Books, 1995). All of these works focus on Noriega and his removal from power. 
24 Jane Kellett Cramer, “‘Just Cause’ or Just Politics: U.S. Panama Invasion and 
Standardizing Qualitative Tests for Diversionary War,” Armed Forces & Society 32 
(January 2006), 178-201.  
25 Fischer, Presidential War Powers, 86. Other works that look at the justifications for 
the invasion of Panama include Jane Kellett Cramer “‘Just Cause’ or Just Politics: U.S. 
Panama Invasion and Standardizing Qualitative Tests for Diversionary War” Armed 
Forces & Society 32 (January 2006) 178-201.   
26	Max Hilaire, International Law and the United States Military Intervention in the 
Western Hemisphere (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1997).    	
27 Anthony D'Amato, “The Invasion of Panama Was A Lawful Response to Tyranny,” 
American Journal of International Law 84, (1990), 524. 
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Lawrence Yates has written the only historical work on Operation Just Cause.  
He shows how Panama had been a growing problem for the United States during the late 
1980s.  His study considers the population of American citizens in Panama and places 
the intervention into a larger context of U.S.-Panamanian relations.28  While he discusses 
the large population of Americans, he limits his work to the late 1980s.  He has also 
written a second volume concerned with the invasion, but this work is an operational 
history.29   
Operation Just Cause is a topic that would benefit from “retiring the puppets” by 
considering the larger historical relations between the United States and Panama, and 
looking beyond the capture of Noriega.  New scholarship that challenges the puppet 
narrative has been published but these works do not take into account when the United 
States military became directly involved in the Western Hemisphere.  This thesis studies 
Operation Just Cause by connecting the invasion with one hundred and fifty years of 
U.S.-Panamanian relations.  Unlike previous works, it avoids focusing solely on 
Noriega, which otherwise supports a “puppet” narrative.   
To that end this thesis is structured in four chapters.  Chapter II looks at how U.S. 
goals in Panama evolved over time.  It begins with California’s Gold Rush, followed by 
the construction of the trans-isthmus railroad, and concludes with the Panama Canal.  
                                                                                                                                           
	
28 Yates The U.S. Military Intervention in Panama, 15. 
29Lawrence A. Yates, The U.S. Military Intervention in Panama: Operation Just Cause, 
December 1989-January 1990 (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, United 
States Army, 2014). 
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Chapter III examines the establishment of the Canal Zone and the building tensions 
between long-term American residents, so-called “Zonians,” and Panamanians.  It 
examines steps Panamanians took to gain control of the Canal and how U.S. policy 
slowly accommodated them.  Chapter IV focuses on the deteriorating relations between 
the United States and Panama during the 1980s and Noriega’s rise as the de facto head 
of state.  This chapter shows how the United States attempted to use economic and 
political pressure to remove Noriega from power, but failed.  A “puppet” narrative 
would suggest that Noriega could be manipulated or easily replaced by his puppet-
master, yet facts show that this was not the case.  Instead he responded to American 
pressure by harassing and threatening American citizens.  Chapter V analyzes how the 
overt threat to American citizens led to a direct military intervention.  The thesis 
concludes with a brief discussion of the legacy of the United States in Panama and its 
slow departure during the ten years that followed.  
   14 
CHAPTER II  
AMERICANS IN THE ISTHMUS  
A dispute arose during the 2008 U.S. Presidential election over the birthplace of 
one of the candidates.  Opponents accused him of being born in a foreign country and 
thus ineligible to become President. Republican nominee John McCain might have 
become the first U.S. President born in a foreign country.  His birthplace was Coco Solo 
Naval Air Station in the Panama Canal Zone.1 The controversy was a curious footnote to 
the history of the Canal Zone, an unincorporated American territory straddling the 
Panama Canal and subject to American sovereignty for over seventy years.  Like the 
other 8,123 Americans born in the Canal Zone, McCain was considered a natural born 
American citizen and thus eligible for the Presidency.2  This population of American 
citizens, equivalent to a small city or large university, dated to the 1850s when the 
discovery of gold in California first led fortune hunters to the Isthmus, seeking quick 
transit to the Gold Rush.  It was the first time, but not the last, that Americans surged 
into Panama.3  
                                                
1 Carl Hulse, “McCain’s Canal Zone Birth Prompts Queries About Whether That Rules 
Him Out,” New York Times, February 28, 2008. 
2 Adam Liptak, "A Hint of New Life to a McCain Birth Issue," New York Times, July 11, 
2008.   
3 Michael L. Conniff, Panama and the United States, 3rd ed. (Athens: University of 
Georgia Press, 2012), 14-15.   
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U.S. citizens trekked along well-worn Spanish colonial trails.  Since the sixteenth 
Century defeat of the Incas, silver from Peru had journeyed to the Isthmus of Panama 
where mule trains carried it overland to waiting ships.4  From there, the silver sailed to 
Havana and then Seville on the annual Spanish treasure fleet.5  The economy grew 
marginally, but tropical disease and the harsh jungle environment killed men and 
destroyed materials, hampering settlement.  Panama’s location on the shortest overland 
route between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans made it a vital link in Spain’s global 
empire and a strategic thoroughfare for colonial trade, until its importance of the isthmus 
declined with the depletion of Peruvian silver and the development of new overland 
routes to Buenos Aires.6 The centrality of the Isthmus had faded by 1808, when the Latin 
American wars for independence began.7  Yet it remained an important thoroughfare 
between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans for travelers.  
Panama played little direct role in the wars of independence due to its small and 
scattered population.  The region remained loyal to Spain, until 1821, when elites bribed 
the Spanish garrisons to abandon their posts and sail to Cuba.  With independence 
                                                
4 Carl Ortwin Sauer, The Early Spanish Main, 4th ed. (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1992), 43.    
5 Alejandro de la Fuente, Havana and the Atlantic in the Sixteenth Century (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2000), 106.   
6 Christopher Ward, Imperial Panama: Commerce and Conflict in Isthmian America 
1550-1800, 2nd ed. (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1994), 33.  
7 Steve J. Stern, Peru's Indian Peoples and the Challenge of Spanish Conquest: 
Huamanga to 1640, 2nd ed. (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1993), 113.  
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secured, Panamanians swore allegiance to Gran Colombia and Simon Bolivar.8  Gran 
Colombia broke apart into Colombia, Ecuador, and Venezuela in 1830, but Panama 
remained part of Colombia until 1903.  During that time both Colombian and 
Panamanian leaders realized that as the pivot between the Americas, Panama could 
influence trade in the region and around the globe.  Limited resources and repeated 
depressions kept the region from utilizing its status as a trade route until 1849, when 
American citizens began arriving. 9 
News spread quickly of the discovery of gold in California in 1848. Fortune 
seekers raced to California from all over the world.10  Those coming from Europe and 
the Eastern United States, if they could afford it, chose the Panamanian route.  It took six 
weeks and was the fastest.11  Most prospectors arrived first in the city of Chargés then 
journeyed across the Isthmus on river barges and mules. The Gold Rush brought 
thousands of travelers who spent money on transport, supplies and services, and injected 
capital into the Panamanian economy. American citizens resented the high cost of goods 
and services and complained that merchants overcharged them.  Panamanians accused 
foreigners of vandalizing property and being prone to violence. Panamanian merchants 
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also directed their anger at foreigners who established businesses that directly competed 
with them.12  
The interaction between American citizens and Panamanians increased during 
the construction of the trans-Isthmus railroad.  Prior to the Gold Rush the United States 
saw the strategic value of the Isthmus of Panama and signed the Bidlack-Mallarino 
Treaty with Colombia in 1846, which granted the United States the right to construct a 
railroad across Panama.  The treaty also granted the United States the right to intervene 
in Panama in order to defend American citizens and property.  With a treaty in hand, the 
United States contracted a private company to build a railroad.  The rail line divided 
profits between the Colombian government and the New York based investors.  The 
large volume of trade crossing Panama during the Gold Rush reinforced the economic 
value of building a railroad. Colombian officials approved of the provision that allowed 
the United States military to intervene in Panama in order to protect American citizens 
with the stipulation that the United States helped assert Colombian sovereignty.13 
 The large presence of American citizens on the Isthmus provided an economic 
benefit to the government in Bogotá, which received half the profits from the railroad.  
Colombia also saved money by abdicating responsibility for security in Panama to the 
U.S. military and the railroad company.14  The railroad, however, failed to reinvigorate 
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the local Panamanian economy. Instead of resurrecting colonial era prosperity, revenues 
from the line bypassed the region. During construction Panamanian merchants benefited 
from selling supplies, and mule train drivers profited by ferrying them.  But as the 
railroad neared completion, the need for goods and services from towns in the interior 
declined and eventually ceased.  Only Panama City and Chargés, the main rail hubs on 
the Pacific and Atlantic side, saw continued economic growth from passengers transiting 
across the Isthmus.15  Panamanians felt exploited by travelers and saw little benefit from 
the railroad.  
Resentment towards foreigners triggered a number of riots against Americans 
citizens.  The largest occurred in 1856.  The so-called Watermelon Riot erupted when an 
American prospector took a piece of watermelon from a Panamanian fruit vendor 
without paying.16 The vendor demanded payment, and guns and knives were drawn.  
The bloodshed spiraled into a riot in Panama City.  The United States landed one 
hundred and sixty soldiers who established order in the city, but the riot claimed two 
Panamanians and fifteen American lives.17  The intervention during the Watermelon 
Riot was the first time the U.S. military deployed troops to quell hostility in Panama, but 
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it would not be the last.  By 1903 the United States had invoked the intervention powers 
granted under the Bidlack-Mallarino Treaty thirteen times to protect American citizens 
and property.18   
The interventions focused on the major cities, with troops landing in Panama 
City seven times, Colón six times and twice in Boca del Toro.19 The majority of these 
incidents involved small forces of Marines landing to establish order or a U.S. naval ship 
firing a broadside to quell hostilities.  Another incident of note occurred in 1885 when 
the United States, at the request of the Colombian government, used six warships to land 
over a thousand troops in Colón and Panama City to thwart a secession movement.  The 
U.S. military occupied the cities for two days and then relinquished control to the 
Colombian military.  This occurred despite the fact that General Rafael Aizpuru, the 
Panamanian general leading the rebellion, offered to place “the Sovereign State of 
Panama” under the protection of the United States.  The American consul Thomas 
Adamson declined the offer.20  
Panamanians never fully accepted Colombia’s authority.  At the same time that 
American citizens poured into the Isthmus, Panamanians were attempting become an 
independent nation. Besides the 1885 rebellion, Panama attempted to secede on three 
separate occasions.  Each time, Colombia reasserted sovereignty with support from the 
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United States.21 Historian Alex Perez-Venero argues that this signaled to the region that 
the “Isthmians—and even the Colombians—could not forge the destiny of their own 
land without interference from the United States.”22  During the colonial period Panama 
was reliant on Spain.  After independence, Colombia replaced Spain as Panama had few 
economic resources, aside from its geography.  The one significant change was that the 
United States acted as a brake on Panamanian ambitions for autonomy.  The United 
States sided with Colombia on the Isthmus—up until they failed to reach an agreement 
for a trans-isthmus canal.23           
Dreams of a canal across Central America dated back to the sixteenth century 
when Alvaro de Saaverdra, a distant cousin of Hernan Cortez, presented Charles V a 
scheme to dredge a canal.24  For the next three hundred years, numerous impractical 
plans were proposed.  But not until the late nineteenth century had technology advanced 
sufficiently to make a trans-Isthmusian canal a reality.  A French company led by 
Ferdinand de Lesseps, the developer behind the Suez Canal, made the first serious 
attempt. Yet tropical disease and the logistical challenges of undertaking a massive 
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construction project in the jungles of Central America defeated the project.25  The failure 
of the French effort demonstrated the complexity of attempting a large-scale engineering 
project in the jungles of Central America.26  Despite these challenges, however, the 
United States viewed an interoceanic canal as a strategic necessity worth any risk.  
Previous plans for a canal in Central America focused entirely on economics.  
Colombia and Panama both recognized the geographic importance of the Isthmus and 
saw a transoceanic canal as the means to develop the region.27 Economic motives drove 
Panama and Colombia.  For the United States, an inter-oceanic canal represented a 
strategic necessity.  Development of the west coast during the later half of the nineteenth 
century and U.S. expansion into the Pacific after 1898 forced the United States to defend 
two large coastlines.  Naval theorist Alfred Thayer Mahan had warned that the 
“exclusion of direct European political control from the Isthmus of Panama is as really 
[sic] a matter of national defence as is the protection of New York Harbor.”  Mahan 
advocated the development of an inter-oceanic canal to provide quick passage for U.S. 
naval vessels between the Atlantic and Pacific.28  He cited the 1898 Spanish-American 
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war to prove the need.  The battleship USS Oregon took sixty-six days to journey from 
the Pacific coast of the United States around South America to join the Atlantic fleet.29  
The war only lasted 180 days.30  A trans-oceanic canal would have reduced transit 
between the two oceans by half.  The United States needed a two-ocean navy.  The most 
cost-effective way to acquire such a capacity navy was not by laying more keels, but by 
digging a canal.   
Before digging a canal, the administration of Theodore Roosevelt entered into 
negotiations with the Colombian government in early 1902. U.S. Secretary of State John 
Hay and the Secretary of the Colombian Legation Tomas Herrán negotiated in 
Washington, D.C., and signed the Hay-Herrán Treaty on 22 January 1903.  The treaty 
required the United States to pay Colombia a lump sum of $10 million in gold and an 
annuity of $250,000 for the next 100 years.  In return, the United States gained control of 
a six-mile wide territory to build a canal.  Colombia retained sovereignty over this 
territory.  The treaty also required Colombia to provide protection for the Canal and, if it 
failed to do so, the United States could intervene as it had with the railroad.31  The 
United States Senate ratified the Treaty on 14 March 1903.   
                                                
29 Ken Lomax, "A Chronicle of the Battleship Oregon," Oregon Historical Quarterly 
106, no. 1 (Spring 2005): 135. 
30Louis A.  Pérez Jr., The War of 1898: The United States and Cuba in History and 
Historiography (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998), 5-6. 
31 McCullough, Path Between the Seas, 333. 
   23 
The Colombian government and public responded negatively to the negotiated 
treaty.  The Colombian Senate rejected the treaty and negotiations broke down between 
the two nations. First, the Senate considered the payments too low since they had 
received the same amount for the railroad.  Second, the treaty did not satisfactorily 
guarantee Colombian sovereignty.  This rejection outraged Roosevelt, who believed the 
Colombian government wanted unreasonable concessions.  He did not consider the 
Colombian public’s negative reaction and refused to renegotiate the terms of the treaty. 
32 
The failure to ratify a treaty frustrated Panamanian liberal elites, who felt 
neglected by the conservative Colombian government.  They wanted to take advantage 
of Panama’s geography by developing ties with either the United States or a European 
power.  This was a common policy of liberal governments in Latin American during the 
nineteenth century.  The failed treaty negotiations concerned these elites who feared a 
canal would never be dug.33  A new secession movement gathered strength, emboldened 
by the treaty’s failure. The United States had previously supported Columbian control of 
Panama in accordance with the Bidlack-Mallarino Treaty.34  When Panama again 
attempted to secede from Colombian rule in 1903 and declared independence, the United 
States changed its policy.  U.S. battleships prevented Colombia from landing troops to 
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establish order.35  The support provided by the United States resulted in Panamanian 
independence.  
The newly created Republic of Panama swiftly entered into negotiations with the 
United States.  U.S. Secretary of State John Hay and the Panamanian Ambassador to the 
United States Philippe Bunau-Varilla negotiated a treaty almost indistinguishable from 
the Hay-Herrán Treaty, but with two significant changes.  First, the treaty granted the 
United States the Canal in perpetuity, unlike the Hay-Herrán Treaty, which limited canal 
ownership to one hundred years.  Second, the planned Canal Zone expanded from six to 
ten miles.36  The Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty outraged Panamanians, who felt Bunau-
Varilla betrayed their country in return for personal wealth.37  Bunau-Varilla had only 
lived in Panama since 1884 when he arrived as part of the French Canal project.  He had 
invested in the French canal, and benefited personally when the Americans bought out 
French investors.  After negotiating the treaty, he returned to France.38 
 Under Article I the United States agreed to “guarantee and maintain the 
independence of the Republic of Panama.” Panama became a protectorate of the United 
States.  In return Article II granted “the United States in perpetuity the use, occupation 
and control of a zone of land and land under water for the construction maintenance, 
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operation, sanitation and protection of [a] Canal of the width of ten miles extending to 
the distance of five miles on each side of the center line of the route of the Canal to be 
constructed.”39 Similar to the concerns of the Hay-Herran treaty, sovereignty of the 
Canal Zone became a point of contention.  Technically, Panama retained titular 
sovereignty over the Zone, yet the United States treated it like an American territory.40 It 
did so because the region was vital for the operation, maintenance, and defense of the 
Panama Canal.    
The strategic necessity of a canal led the United States government to accept the 
risk of a large-scale construction project in Central America, provided steps were taken 
to mitigate the risks.  The failed French attempt showed two majors hurdles: the 
prevalence of tropical diseases and the logistical challenges of construction in a jungle. 
The death of several key French officials from yellow fever scandalized the French 
public and contributed to the abandonment of the project.41  To combat diseases, 
particularly yellow fever and malaria, the U.S. Army applied the knowledge it gained in 
Cuba during the Spanish American War.   
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In 1898, U.S. Army doctors Walter Reed and William Gorgas proved the link 
between mosquitos and the spread of yellow fever, a theory proposed by Cuban doctors.  
The U.S. Army instituted quarantines and fumigation programs to kill mosquitos and 
isolate sick patients to prevent the spread of the disease in Havana. Reed and Gorgas 
succeeded in eradicating yellow fever in the city within eight months.42  As the chief 
medical officer for the Panama Canal, Gorgas extended these policies to Panama.  
However, the scale of this task was greater.  Havana required the elimination of yellow 
fever from a city.  Panama required elimination throughout a country.   
Gorgas implemented three policies.  First, he established hospitals in the Canal 
Zone, Panama City and Colón to treat and quarantine patients with yellow fever.  
Second, he began a large-scale fumigation program to limit the mosquito populations, 
the main vector of yellow fever.  Finally, Gorgas pushed for the creation of water lines 
and sewage systems, which benefited the average Panamanians tremendously.43  The 
water lines ended the centuries’ long practice of cisterns, which had provided breeding 
grounds for mosquitos.44 These policies eradicated yellow fever within a year and a 
half.45  Worker mortality rates declined.  Some Panamanian officials expressed 
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annoyance because the sanitation measures ignored their sovereignty but the goodwill 
generated by new hospitals and public works offset this. 46   
Having diminished the threat of disease, U.S. administrators next faced the 
logistical challenges of operating in the jungle. A complex logistics network provided 
food and supplies to workers.  When construction began in 1904, workers poured into 
the region.  The demand for food increased to the point that local supplies could not feed 
everyone.  Panamanian merchants increased food prices to take advantage of the demand 
but were unable to adequately feed the rapidly growing population, which reached 
62,810 American citizens by 1912.47  The increased prices and limited supplies resulted 
in workers seeking cheaper but less nutritious foods such as sugar cane, which resulted 
in malnourishment and a decline in productivity.  To counteract malnourishment, the 
Isthmian Canal Commission established a commissary system in the Canal Zone that 
sold essential food and provisions to the workforce at a subsidized rate during the 
Panama Canal’s construction.48  Unlike sanitation measures, the Commissary offered no 
direct benefit to the Panamanians.  Instead, it separated the Canal Zone from the 
Panamanian economy.   The Commissary, or comissario as Panamanians called the 
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stores and goods sold there, would become a lightning rod for hostility to the long-term 
American presence in Panama.49 The unintended consequence was the creation of an 
isolated and separate American economy. 
Within its first year of operation, as Americans flocked to Panama during the 
construction of the Canal, the Commissary expanded its selection.  A system that started 
as a means to supply staple foods to workers began offering a wide range of products 
including luxury goods, furniture, and clothing.50  Local merchants expressed their 
displeasure at this competition.  In an attempt to quell their anger and prevent the 
Commissary being abused, President Roosevelt issued a decree that limited goods sold 
in the Commissary to those that could not be obtained in Panama.  In August 1905, 
however, Canal officials declared that merchants were not reliably supplying goods at a 
fair price, so the Commissary expanded.51  
Panamanian merchants reacted negatively to the increased competition from the 
Commissary, which charged no taxes, paid no import duties, and offered better quality 
goods at lower prices.  Colonel George W. Goethals, the chief engineer and first Canal 
Zone Governor, warned “once Panamanian merchants get their grips on us they will 
squeeze us dry.”  He cited the price increases by Panamanian merchants being “a 
problem that the French canal project faced” and proposed, “the Americans used the 
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Commissary to avoid it.” He concluded that the French project saw “the cost of every 
item of work [become] enormously greater.”52  The creation of a commissary system 
limited the impact of price increases from construction but it also isolated workers from 
the local economy. In order to prevent this isolation, Goethals agreed to prohibit the 
commissaries from selling luxury items, but like President Roosevelt he also went back 
on his promise.53  
In the Canal Zone the Commissary became an economic force.  It provided all 
sorts of goods and services to Canal employees and eventually military personnel 
stationed in the Zone.  By 1914, when the Panama Canal opened, the Commissary 
boasted “wholesale dry goods and grocery departments, a mail order division, twenty 
two general stores, seven cigar stores, a cold storage and ice making facility, a tailor and 
cleaning shop, a bakery, coffee-roasting plant, an ice cream factory, a laundry and 
packing department, seventeen hostels, two terminal hotels, and forty eight mess 
halls.”54 Subsidies paid by U.S. taxpayers and profits from Canal revenues financed the 
Commissary.  The only benefit to Panama stemmed from the black market that 
developed.55  The Panamanian government actively targeted the black market and passed 
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regulations to limit comissario goods and charge duties.56  The efforts to halt the black 
market failed and the local economy could not compete with the Commissary.  The 
expansion by the Commissary to supply ships passing through the Canal further 
weakened the Panamanian economy and caused government revenues to decline.57   
The measures that United States officials took during construction of the Panama 
Canal were a mixed blessing.  On the one hand, sanitation measures carried out by the 
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers reduced disease and improved public health. On the other 
hand, the Commissary system walled off the Canal Zone from the Panamanian economy 
and diverted trade from ships passing through the Canal.  For generations, the 
Panamanian upper class had hoped construction of a canal would turn their country into 
a “Hanseatic country,” transcending its lack of resources by embracing trade similar to 
the Hanseatic League of early modern Europe.58 Panama’s marginal position in the 
Spanish Empire and Colombia would become a memory as it became a major center of 
international trade.   
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Yet the Canal did not bring the prosperity that Panamanians had imagined.  
Instead, Panama became an American protectorate, bisected by a foreign military.  
Instead of a “Hanseatic Country” economically rooted in global trade, a new form of 
dependency began as profits from the Canal were diverted to the United States.  The 
affronts to Panama and the limits on its sovereignty would be further exacerbated by the 
efforts to defend the Panama Canal and the evolving role of the United States military in 
Panama. 
The United States sent troops into Panama thirteen times, but never permanently 
stationed them on the Isthmus.  The construction of an inter-oceanic canal in 1903 
changed the importance of Panama for the U.S. military and a formal military 
occupation began, which lasted for ninety-six years.  Responsible for the defense of the 
Panama Canal, U.S. military planners frequently revised plans in an attempt to meet 
ever-changing threats to the strategically valuable Panama Canal.  
The Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty granted the United States the right to defend the 
Panama Canal.  Article XXIII stated that the United States had the right “to employ 
armed forces for the safety or protection of the Canal, or of the ships that make use of 
the same, or the railways and auxiliary works,” and that it could employ this right “at all 
times and in its discretion, to use its police and its land and naval forces or to establish 
fortifications for these purposes.”59  The treaty established the framework that the United 
States would use to station troops and develop tactics to defend the Panama Canal. Early 
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defenses, however, focused on maintaining civil order and did not consider a hostile 
power directly attacking the Canal.60  The initial budgets projected no expenditures for 
defense, but costs quickly grew.  Beginning in 1914 the United States spent a quarter of 
the budget for the Canal on defense spending.61    
Despite the increase, early defenses were modest and focused on a series of 
coastal artillery guns meant to deter a naval assault.  As such, they mirrored military 
defense plans for the United States during the majority of the nineteenth century.62  The 
first permanent U.S. military presence in Panama arrived in 1911, an Infantry regiment 
composed of 812 enlisted men and 33 officers from the 10th Infantry Division.63  By 
1914 the modest troop presence grew to include a Marine battalion and three Coastal 
Artillery companies, called the “Panama Canal Guard Force.” 64  But, the total number of 
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U.S. troop represented less than 1 percent of the U.S. Army’s total strength at the time.65  
With defenses in place and construction complete, the United States officially opened 
the Panama Canal on 15 August 1914.  Despite the importance of linking the Atlantic 
and Pacific for the first time in millennia, global news coverage focused on the fighting 
in Europe, which had begun the month before.66 
President Woodrow Wilson initially proclaimed the Canal neutral during the 
First World War, like the United States itself.  Belligerent and neutral nations were 
allowed to use the Canal, but they had to follow the rules of the Hague Convention and 
long-established international norms regarding neutral nations during war.  President 
Wilson issued proclamations of neutrality twice more, in 1915 and 1916.67  To enforce 
the neutrality, the United States increased the number of American soldiers in Panama to 
6,248.68  No combatant nation challenged the neutrality of the Canal during the course of 
the war because of the strength of the United States in the Western Hemisphere, but also 
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the modest strength of the Central Powers’ naval forces.69  Ships passed through the 
Canal with no disruption until the United States entered the war in 1917.70  Then, the 
defense of the Canal received two modifications.  First, soldiers were placed aboard 
transiting ships in order to prevent sabotage.  Second, the Central Powers were denied 
access to the Canal.  After the war, however, changes in technology led to a new danger: 
a knockout blow from aerial bombardment.71    
In 1921 the U.S. Navy conducted its first strategic exercise to defend the Canal 
from aerial attack.  The exercise demonstrated the Canal’s vulnerability to an aerial 
attack.72  The United States military needed air bases in Panamanian territory to station 
pursuit aircraft that could attack enemy bombers before they reached the Canal.  The 
Hay-Bunau-Varilla treaty allowed the United States “the right to acquire by purchase or 
by the exercise of the right of eminent domain, any lands, buildings, water rights or other 
properties necessary and convenient for … protection of the Canal.”73  The United States 
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could have acquired air bases by invoking the treaty with little concern over Panama’s 
objections, yet this did not occur.  By this time there was a new Roosevelt in the White 
House.  President Franklin Roosevelt changed the polies of the United States toward 
Latin America.  Instead of the arrogant Gunboat Diplomacy of earlier administrations he 
began the Good Neighbor Policy, which advocated negotiation and accommodation.  
The United States entered into lengthy negotiations to acquire the air bases and signed 
the Hull-Alfaro Treaty of 1939 with Panama.74  The United States considered the threat 
of Axis subversion in Latin America and Panama to be genuine.  The vocal support for 
fascism by Rafael Trujillo of the Dominican Republic and Juan Peron of Argentina 
alarmed policy makers. U.S. Secretary of State Cordell Hull wrote in his memoirs, “To 
me the danger to the Western Hemisphere was real and imminent. It was not limited to 
the possibility of a military invasion. It was more acute in its indirect form of 
propaganda, penetration, organizing political parties, buying some adherents, and 
blackmailing others . . . the same technique was obvious in Latin America.”75 The treaty 
emphasized adjustment and accommodation between the United States and Panama.76  It 
ended Panama’s protectorate status and expanded its role in canal defense.  
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Officially Panama and the United States now carried out the defense of the Canal 
in partnership.  In reality, however, the United States had the better trained and equipped 
military.  With a treaty securing air bases in place, the United States began to deploy 
troops to Panama and increased the forces on the Isthmus as the world moved 
inextricably towards war.  
When the war began in 1939, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt issued a 
neutrality proclamation similar to President Wilson’s.77 Belligerent nations were allowed 
to use the waterway, provided crews followed instructions and allowed American troops 
onboard during transit. As the United States shifted toward the Allied cause and ended 
its neutrality, the Canal became a vulnerable target in the assessment of U.S. military 
planners.  The shift occurred during 1940 and 1941 as the United States began 
provocative naval actions against Germany in the Atlantic.  The Canal Zone turned into 
a military bastion and civilian control ended as the civilian Canal Zone Governor 
transferred authority to the military commander of the Panama Canal Department.78  
More troops deployed to the region and stringent protective measures were enforced to 
protect the Canal.   
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A troop buildup had begun in the late 1930s when U.S. military planners realized 
the decrepit status of the defenses of the American military bases in Hawaii, Alaska, the 
Philippines, and Panama.79  In 1939, the Canal Zone contained 13,451 U.S. soldiers in 
two infantry and two artillery regiments.80 In 1940 when it looked likely to enter the war 
the defense of the Canal became a priority.  The United States negotiated several 
agreements to acquire territory for air bases throughout Latin America to prevent a 
hostile nation from placing bombers within range of the Panama Canal.81  As the Second 
World War progressed the threats seemed to multiply in the eyes of U.S. military 
planners.  When France fell in 1940 the German Navy gained access to French ports and 
sent U-boats further into the Atlantic to threaten shipping.  Washington quickly realized 
the Royal Navy could not protect the Atlantic as it had in the First World War.  This 
caused the defense of the Canal to take on new importance.  By midsummer 1941 the 
number of troops grew to 28,700.  
In July of 1941 panic engulfed the Canal Zone when Naval Intelligence warned 
of a possible Japanese torpedo attack.  This resulted in increased inspection of Japanese 
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ships entering the Canal and a request for more troops.82  After July the U.S. military 
surged forces so that on 7 December 1941, when Pearl Harbor was attacked, there were 
31,400 troops stationed in Panama.83 
The American military’s efforts to protect the Canal extended into both the 
Caribbean and the Pacific.84  This expansion came about in part when Britain offered the 
United States bases in Bermuda, Newfoundland, and the West Indies as part of the Bases 
for Destroyers Agreement and Lend-Lease.  The new bases projected the reach of the 
United States military into the Caribbean and expanded the defense of the Canal.  It also 
meant that the American military presence in Panama expanded its focus on a wider 
geographic area.85 
Despite the new protective measures, panic engulfed the Canal Zone after the 
attack on Pearl Harbor. Americans in the region feared that the Canal would be the next 
Japanese target, despite being three times further from Japan than Hawaii.86  The War in 
the Pacific was a naval contest that relied on a huge overseas logistic network and the 
Panama Canal served as a transit point for supplies and war ships.  Thus, U.S. military 
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planners feared that the Japanese military had developed submarines capable of reaching 
the Canal.87   
During the Second World War the Canal transported over 16,724,222 tons of 
military cargo from the Atlantic to the Pacific.88  Warships also transited through, 
particularly the aircraft carriers, Hornet, Wasp, and Yorktown, which played important 
roles in the Doolittle Raid, the Battle of the Coral Sea, and the Battle of Midway.  The 
importance of the Canal to the war effort has come into question by scholars recently.  
They argue that the United States could have used rail networks to transport goods to the 
Pacific coast and warships could have transited around Cape Horn.89  Because of the 
nature of war, it is impossible to definitely predict how the savings of a few days 
impacted complex military campaigns.  For instance in 1942 the time saved by 
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American warships transiting through the Canal may have made the difference during 
the Battle of Midway.90 
As the war progressed, it became apparent to the U.S. military that the Axis 
powers would not be able to launch an attack against Panama.  In 1942 a United States 
naval fleet sank four Japanese aircraft carriers at the Battle of Midway and blunted the 
ability of the Imperial Japanese Navy to conduct offensive operations.  The following 
year, in 1943, the Allies won the Battle of the Atlantic, which ended the threat of a 
German attack against the Canal.91 A direct military threat ended and the United States 
diverted troops from the Canal Zone to the European and Pacific theatres.  Panama 
began the war as a vital strategic link that needed to be defended at all costs and saw a 
huge influx of troops.  By the end of the war the Canal became a transport link, 
important to the war effort but not a strategic necessity.  This change was not due to 
failed plans but rather the changing fortunes of the war.  The United States began to 
conduct the war more offensively when it became apparent the Axis powers had not 
coordinated their attacks and no longer threatened the Western Hemisphere. Towards the 
Second World War, military units in the Canal Zone were primarily being used to train 
Latin American militaries.92 
                                                
90 Richard Overy, Why the Allies Won (New York: W. W. Norton, 1997), 3-4.  
91 Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett, A War To Be Won: Fighting The Second 
World War, 1937-1945 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000), 33.  
92 Lindsay-Poland, Emperors in the Jungle, 106. 
   41 
When the Second World War ended, the defense of the Panama Canal changed 
again, as it had after the First World War.  The development of long-range bombers and 
intercontinental ballistic missiles able to reach Panama was still years away, but the 
threat of atomic bombs led U.S. military planners to minimize importance of the Canal.93 
The Canal needed to be defended, but it became apparent that in the event of a global 
conflict with the Soviet Union nothing could be done to protect the Panama Canal from 
nuclear weapons.  Military planners assessed it would only play a role transferring 
warships and supplies between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans prior to a nuclear war.   
The United States had committed itself to expand the size of its navy and 
acquired a two-ocean fleet during the war.94  The development of a two-ocean navy by 
the United States diminished the Panama Canal’s importance. The U.S. Navy was no 
longer the small force it had been during the late nineteenth century when Alfred Thayer 
Mahan wrote on the importance of the Isthmus of Panama.  The United States launched 
6,768 ships during the course of the Second World War and with this large fleet the 
Americans became the predominant naval power.95 The days when a small fleet of 
battleships was expected to project a two-ocean navy to defend the United States using a 
canal as a speedy link had ended.  The United States now began to develop 
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commitments around the globe requiring a large permanent naval presence. The 
diminishing strategic importance of the Panama Canal did not end the Canal Zone’s 
military value altogether.   
The United States originally established military bases on the Isthmus of Panama 
to defend the Canal.  As the Canal’s strategic value diminished the missions of the bases 
changed.96  No longer focused on defense, the military bases were used to project 
American influence in Latin America.97  To see the expansion of the U.S. military 
mission one need only look at the evolution of the military command assigned to defend 
the Panama Canal.  Originally the Army created a Headquarters of troops in Panama in 
1914, attached to the Eastern Army Department located in New York.  In 1916 the U.S. 
Army relocated the headquarters to Quarry Heights, Panama, and a year later the Army 
established a separate Panama Canal Department.  The Panama Canal Department 
became the Caribbean Defense Command in 1941 and then Caribbean Command in 
1948.  The change reflected more than a new title.  The Army commander at Quarry 
Heights gained operational control of troops stationed throughout the Caribbean 
expanding his authority outside of Panama.98 In 1963 the Department of Defense 
renamed Caribbean Command to U.S. Southern Command.  The name reinforced the 
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responsibility of U.S. Southern Command to include all of Latin America.  The 
Command’s mission focused on developing partnerships with Latin American militaries 
and curtailing the influence of the Cuban revolution.99    
Expansion of the U.S. military mission beyond Canal defense aggravated 
Panamanians nationalists.  They challenged the way the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty 
limited their sovereignty and the lack of Panamanian inputs over the operation of the 
Panama Canal.  A number of treaties were negotiated between the two countries but 
none dealt with the long-term implications of the United States’ perpetual ownership of 
the Panama Canal or of the increasing population of Americans. The bases and their 
missions came under closer scrutiny, and Panamanians protested how the U.S. military 
missions shifted from defense of the Canal.100  Growing resentment compelled the 
United States to reevaluate its role and eventually led to accommodation. 
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CHAPTER III  
PANAMANIANS AND ZONIANS  
On the morning of 23 March 1911, Theodore Roosevelt reputedly assented to an 
audience at the University of California at Berkeley, “I took the Canal Zone.”1  The 
press reported differing versions of the statement and a debate soon emerged.  Some 
scholars have seen the speech as a frank admission by Roosevelt of his Big Stick foreign 
policy and U.S. imperialism.2  Historian James Vivian, who consulted the original text, 
concluded that Roosevelt most likely said “I took a trip to the Isthmus.” Bad acoustics in 
the theatre may have contributed to the misquotation.  The rest of the speech implied 
taking political action in Washington and not territory in Panama.3  
Nonetheless, while TR’s speech at Berkeley may not have been a frank 
confession of U.S. imperialism, the way that the United States acquired the Panama 
Canal showed extraordinary arrogance.  Article III of the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty 
allowed the United States to act as “if it were the sovereign of the territory within 
which” the Canal and Canal Zone were “located to the entire exclusion of the exercise 
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by the Republic of Panama of any such sovereign rights, power or authority.”4  These 
rights resulted in the creation of a veritable American colony, the Canal Zone, in the 
middle of Panama. The legal system in the Zone was based on American common law 
and not Panamanian civil law.5  The Panama Canal Commission (PCC) established a 
separate police force, the Zone Police, which answered only to the Canal Zone Governor 
and enforced American laws.6  The language of the Zone was English, U.S. dollars the 
official currency.  American citizens living in the Canal Zone and the U.S. government 
treated it as an American territory no different from Puerto Rico, Guam, or Hawaii.7   
An American identity emerged in the Zone.  Historian Peter Sahlins argues that 
in borderlands “states did not simply impose their values and boundaries on local 
society.”  Instead, “local society was a motive force in the formation and consolidation 
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of nationhood and the territorial state.”8  The local society in the Canal Zone formed and 
consolidated an American identity and turned the territorial state of the Canal Zone into 
an American territory that stood in stark contrast to Panama.  Zonians had first arrived 
during the construction of the Canal.  Many stayed to operate and maintain it due to the 
generous pay and compensation. When construction began in 1903 the builders realized 
they need a large permanent workforce. The Panama Canal Commission(PCC) provided 
generous benefits and an improved lifestyle in order to convince Americans to work on 
the Canal.9 Governor Goethals encouraged generous pay and benefits for workers.10  
The high pay encouraged many Americans, but other intangibles played a role.  
In an oral history interview, Leo Krziza, an accountant for the PCC said that the 
“Panama Canal was a thirty-two year vacation with pay.”11  Charles Morgan, a senior 
administrator added “I got to live in paradise for 26 years.”12  Most Zonians had positive 
memories of the Canal Zone and considered it a paradise.  They received subsidized 
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housing and many could afford maids, gardeners, and nannies.13  The Commissary 
offered a wide range of goods at discounted prices. American citizens did not have to go 
without luxuries, like ice cream. There were sacrifices, for example television did not 
arrive in the Canal Zone until the late 1960s, but despite this Zonians almost always 
described Panama as a paradise. 14 
  Zonians recounted their leisurely life in the Zone and their involvement in civic 
organizations.15  The Zone boasted two Masonic lodges, a Lion’s Club, and a Rotary 
Club.  The Canal Commission and U.S. military provided recreational centers that 
offered lessons and activities.  Zonians hobbies included “photography, painting, 
classical music, square dancing, bagpiping, scuba diving, baseball, golf, hunting, sailing 
and theatre.”16  The Canal Zone even had an official dish called “Johnny Mazetti,” a 
modified version of a Mid-Western pasta casserole utilizing green onions that many 
Zonians recalled fondly in oral histories, memoirs and a Zonian cookbook.  They 
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claimed to have invented the dish.17 Zonians talked about how they maintained a society 
that had not become divided and still respected authority and American values.  It was 
unlike the America they saw on the news in the 1960s and many Zonians felt they 
preserved the values of American society.18  This sense of community in recalling their 
past overlooked the division the Zone represented.   
The Canal Zone may have been a paradise for Zonians, yet for Panamanians it 
was a species of hell.  In 1958 and 1959 protests against the Panamanian government by 
unemployed workers in Colón spread to the Canal Zone.  The marches began, as a 
demand for higher wages but soon became an anti-American riot.  Over the next several 
months several well-organized marches targeted the Zone, as Panamanian nationalist 
demanded the United States government raise the Panamanian flag.  The Eisenhower 
Administration responded in two ways.  First, it declared that Panama had titular 
sovereignty over the Canal Zone.19 Second, they increased Canal revenue payments to 
Panama to stimulate the economy and fight unemployment, the original cause of the 
marches.20              
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In 1964, Panamanian anger exploded again with four days of rioting against the 
Zone and its inhabitants.21  The so-called Flag Riot began over the flying of the stars and 
stripes.  The policy in the Canal Zone had long been to fly the flag in order to signal that 
the territory belonged to the United States.  President Dwight Eisenhower acknowledged 
Panama’s titular sovereignty over the Zone and had both the American and Panamanian 
flags displayed in prominent areas around the Canal Zone.22  In 1963 American 
President John F. Kennedy and Panamanian President Roberto Chiari announced a 
formal agreement that required all flagpoles in the Canal Zone to display both flags.  
Military bases were exempt.23  Zonians disagreed with this policy and they began to 
display lone American flags, angering Panamanians. 
  On 9 January 1964, students of Balboa High School raised the American flag 
over their schoolafter Christmas break,.  The students intended the act as a display of 
patriotic sentiment and defiance of the policy of displaying both the flags in the Canal 
Zone.  They had the support of their teachers and parents as they camped out in front of 
their school to ensure the flag was not taken down.24  The raising of the flag, however, 
angered students from a nearby high school who marched to the Zone demanding that 
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the Panamanian flag they brought also be raised.  The Zonians rebuffed the Panamanian 
students and tore their flag.25 
This insult to their flag outraged Panamanians.  Word spread into Panama City 
and protesters descended on the Canal Zone.  The Panamanian Government allowed the 
marchers to go to the Zone and the Panamanian National Guard did not immediately 
provide security or crowd control.26  The protest soon erupted into riots.  The Canal 
Zone Governor and the U.S. Southern Command Commander called in American troops 
to defend the Zone and protect American citizens.27  The resulting riots lasted four days 
and left twenty-four Panamanians and four Americans dead.  Blame for the riot and the 
deaths was leveled at the United States and brought attention to issues regarding the 
Panama Canal.  For the Panamanian government, according to historian Alan 
McPherson, the riots were a warning to not let nationalist sentiments get out of control, 
but also an impetus to reconsider the status of the Panama Canal.28 
Much had changed since the era of Theodore Roosevelt. The United States could 
no longer expect Panama to bend to its demands as grievances over sovereignty and 
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nationalism simmered.29  The riots led to renegotiations of the Panama Canal Treaty 
spanning four Presidential Administrations.  
Over the next thirteen years the Johnson, Nixon, and Ford Administrations 
attempted to negotiate a new treaty.  These negotiations were opposed by a majority of 
Zonians, who felt they were the victims in the riots.30  The American public also 
opposed the negotiations since they saw the issue as surrendering the Panama Canal, 
popularly seen as a symbol of national achievement.  While these negotiations were 
under way the United States involvement in Vietnam increased.  This altered many 
Americans’ views of foreign relations.31  
The Johnson Administration began negotiations for a new treaty but they soon 
stalled as the situation in Vietnam consumed more and more of the President’s attention.  
This delay had repercussions for the Panamanian government, which felt pressured by its 
people to resolve ownership of the Panama Canal.  The Panamanian National Guard 
used the stalled negotiations to legitimize a coup in 1968 that ousted the controversial 
President Arnulfo Arias.32  Arias fled to the Canal Zone and then a comfortable exile 
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Miami.  A power struggle among military officers ensued, until Colonel Omar Torrijos 
consolidated power and installed himself as the Maximum Leader of Panama.33   
Torrijos positioned himself as a leader for all Panamanians, and used issue of 
Canal ownership to mobilize popular support. Brandon Groves, an embassy official in 
Panama at the time, recalled Torrijos presented a “large and ominous question mark in 
Americans minds.”  In 1971 the Nixon Administration wanted to “maintain internal 
stability to insure the continued smooth operation and security of the Canal.”34 Torrijos 
challenged this stability.  He borrowed heavily from the rhetoric of decolonization to 
make ownership of the Canal an international issue and mimicked the policies that 
Gamal Nasser of Egypt used to nationalize the Suez Canal.  At the UN Torrijos cast 
himself and Panama as a David, fighting the United States Goliath.35  This resulted in the 
United States vetoing a UN Security Council resolution regarding the Panama Canal.36  
The international attention pushed negotiations forward and National Security Advisor 
Henry Kissinger, who previously ignored Latin American issues, led them.37      
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Zonians expressed anger over the riots and blamed Panamanians for the trouble 
in their paradise.  Most actively fought treaty negotiations.38  They saw the Canal Zone 
as American “property” no different from Puerto Rico or Guam.  They organized letter-
writing campaigns to influence the Senate and halt any new Panama Canal Treaty.  They 
found an ally in the Governor of California, an aspirant to the Presidency.   
Ronald Reagan made opposition to the Canal Treaty a key part of his 1976 
presidential primary challenge against President Gerald Ford.  Reagan would use the 
idea of “giving away” the Panama Canal to great effect and accused his opponent of 
surrendering an American crown jewel.39  During the primaries, Reagan gave a 
nationally televised speech on 31 March 1976, which laid out his foreign policy. 
Regarding the Canal he said, “Negotiations … go forward, negotiations aimed at giving 
up our ownership of the Panama Canal Zone. Apparently, everyone knows about this 
except the rightful owners of the Canal Zone, you, the people of the United States.”   He 
went on to say, “Well, the Canal Zone is not a colonial possession. It is not a long-term 
lease. It is sovereign United States Territory every bit the same as Alaska and all the 
states that were carved from the Louisiana Purchase. We should end those negotiations 
and tell the General: We bought it, we paid for it, we built it, and we intend to keep it.”40  
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That final phrase would be repeated by Reagan and become a rallying call for Zonians 
opposed to negotiations, “We intend to keep it.41  This sentiment electrified the Reagan 
campaign prior to the North Carolina primary and resulted in the Governor winning the 
primary and presenting a credible challenge to President Ford.  However, Reagan’s 
depiction contradicted both laws.  Legally, the Canal Zone had never been American 
territory.   
The original treaty only allowed the United States to act as act as “if it were the 
sovereign” of the Canal Zone.42  Reagan’s statements were political theatrics meant to 
tap into resentment among the general public about America’s diminishing prestige.43  
Better-educated conservative stalwarts such as author William Buckley, Senator Barry 
Goldwater, and even actor John Wayne came out in support of treaty negotiations.  Even 
Reagan himself, once presented with the facts, expressed doubt and asked, “What if they 
are right?”44  The ally Zonians thought they had in Reagan disappeared.  Ford defeated 
Reagan in the Republican primary, but then lost to Governor Jimmy Carter in the general 
election.  
                                                                                                                                           
complete misrepresentation since the United States never had sovereignty over the Canal 
Zone according to the original treaty and the actions of the United States. 
41 Richard Jorden, The Panama Odyssey, 2 ed. (Austin: University of Texas Press, 
2014), 334. 
42 Convention for the Construction of a Ship Canal, U.S.-Panama, November 18, 1903,  
<http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/pan001.asp> accessed 3 March 2012. 
43 Clymer, Drawing the Line at the Big Ditch, 30. 
44 Ronald Reagan, quoted in Ibid., x. 
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When President Carter took office after the 1976 elections, he faced an uphill 
battle to negotiate a new Canal Treaty.  Zonians developed a robust political opposition 
to the Treaty and leveraged all their political influence, which was limited since they had 
no congressional representation nor represented a large voting bloc in any one state.  
They still developed letter-writing campaigns that targeted senators and congressmen.  
Seeking any political ally and waging a public relations campaign to seek the sympathy 
of the American public.45  The Canal Zone had never been an organized U.S. territory, 
but Zonians saw the Canal Zone as their home.  Their grandfathers built the Canal, their 
fathers operated and maintained it, and they struggled to keep it and their way of life.46  
This brought about a battle of perceptions as Zonians were cast as an ungrateful and 
xenophobic group, who lived in an American taxpayer subsidized paradise.47  Zonians 
never acknowledged that they lived in a foreign country at the expense of the American 
taxpayer. 
                                                
45 David Skidmore “Foreign Policy Interest Groups and Presidential Power: Jimmy 
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47 Jane Morris, “A Terminal Case of American Perpetuity,” Rolling Stone, June 1, 1976, 
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 While negotiations over the Canal Treaty were ongoing, several bombs exploded 
throughout the Canal Zone in October 1976.  The crude devices were placed near the 
cars of several prominent Zonians opposed to the treaty negotiations.   
Robert Jorden, the U.S. ambassador in Panama during the treaty negotiations, reported it 
was unclear who placed the explosives.  Zonians blamed the Panamanian government 
for the bombings as an intimidation tactic.  Panamanians countered that the Zonians 
planted the bombs to win sympathy.  Jorden reported to Washington, “One incident 
could have been a coincidence; three explosions in forty-eight hours could only be a 
deliberate campaign.” The guilty party was never identified.48   
 The bombings caused panic and Panamanian and American officials met to 
resolve the issue.  The meeting brought together the heads of each nation’s intelligence 
agencies, the Director for Central Intelligence George H.W. Bush, and Colonel Manuel 
Noriega, the Chief of Intelligence for the Panamanian National Guard. This was the first 
time the two men met, though their paths would cross again twelve years later when 
each became the head of state for his respective nation.  The cordial meeting ended with 
an understanding that “let’s drop this subject—as long as it does not happen again.” No 
loss of life occurred but the bombings demonstrated the vulnerability of the large 
population of American citizens.49  
                                                
48 Jorden, The Panama Odyssey, 334. 
49 Ibid., 339-340. 
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 In addition to the bombings, a rumor emerged that had the U.S. Senate not voted 
to ratify the New Canal Zone Treaty, the Panamanian National Guard would have 
detonated explosives along the Canal and launched a guerrilla war. Torrijos told English 
writer Graham Greene that though the damage to dams could be repaired, it would take 
"three years of rain to fill the Canal. During that time it would be guerrilla war waged 
from the jungle."50 Noriega recounted the plan, dubbed huele a quemado (Spanish for 
burning smell), in his autobiography and laid out the plan, which called for the 
destruction of the Gatum dam and the locks.51  The likelihood of Panama destroying the 
Panama Canal and going to war with the United States seems unlikely.  Evidence is 
incomplete though some documents mentioning the plans were allegedly seized in 1989 
but never released.52  Like the bombings, sabotage against the Canal represented a 
danger the United States could not easily defend against.  U.S. officials realized that a 
threat to the Canal and American citizens could emerge from within Panama itself.  
The Carter Administration signed a new treaty in 1977, despite the best efforts of 
Zonians.  The Torrijos-Carter Treaty established that the Panama Canal would be turned 
over to Panama on 31 December 1999.  The treaty also brought an end to American 
                                                
50 Graham Greene, Getting to Know the General: The Story of an Involvement, new ed. 
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control over the Canal Zone on 30 September 1979, the end of the fiscal year.53  Four 
military bases and a tropical research center remained under American control, but they 
would be turned over on 31 December 1999.  The majority of American citizens no 
longer lived in areas under direct U.S. control and the largesse and insularity of the 
Canal Zone ended.54  An exodus of Zonians began, with many settling along the Gulf 
Coast.  Those who remained worked for the PCC until they qualified for retirement and 
then left—expelled from paradise.55   
Panamanians feted Torrijos for successfully negotiating a treaty with the United 
States that would eventually turn the Canal over to Panama. For the Carter 
Administration, the treaty came at a steep political cost.  While the treaty built goodwill 
in Panama and Latin America, in the United States Carter’s political opponents cast it as 
a case of the President surrendering a symbol of American achievement56. 
 The United States had acted boldly in Panama when American citizens first came 
to the Isthmus in the 1850s.  From that time onward Americans got what they wanted in 
Panama, be it a piece of watermelon, a railroad, or an inter-oceanic Canal.  The Flag 
Riots and the subsequent treaty negotiations were a reaction against the United States’ 
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54 Watson, Combatant Commands, 90. 
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56 William L. Furlong and Margaret E. Scranton, The Dynamics of Foreign 
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aggressive actions, which forced an end to the Canal Zone and the eventual turn over of 
the Canal.  This did not sit well with Zonians and some Americans, but the new Canal 
Treaty and signaled a willingness to eschew colonialism.  For Panama the treaty seemed 
to signal a brighter future.57  The future of the U.S. military remained an open question 
but it seemed likely that negotiations would extend the presence of American soldiers in 
Panama beyond 1999.  
 This bright future, however, would become complicated over the subsequent ten 
years.  Omar Torrijos died in 1981 and Manuel Noriega assumed power in 1983.58  
When Ronald Reagan took office in 1980, it appeared that the Canal Treaty might be 
renegotiated.59  From 1979 to 1989 the presence of American citizens in Panama become 
extremely complicated and provoked the greatest tension between the two nations in 
almost 150 years. 
                                                
57 Conniff, Panama and the United States, 139. 
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CHAPTER IV 
FLAWED POLICIES AND A GROWING THREAT 
On 31 July 1981, a Panamanian Air Force deHaviland-Canada Twin Otter took 
off from the Rio Hato airfield.  The party on board consisted of two pilots, three 
bodyguards, a secretary and, Maximum Leader Omar Efraín Torrijos Herrera. Torrijos 
planned to inspect troops and spend the weekend at a mountain villa.  Flight conditions 
were ideal when the plane took off from Rio Hato at 10:44 a.m. and landed fifteen 
minutes later at Penonomé.  After inspecting the base for forty-five minutes, Torrijos and 
his party departed for their second destination, Coclecito.  Heavy rainstorms rolled in 
and flight conditions became dangerous.  The plane began landing, but then dropped 
from radar coverage, not unusual in the mountainous terrain surrounding the airport.  
When Torrijos and his party failed to arrive, a search began and located the wreckage a 
few days later in the Cerro Marta.1   
Investigators failed to establish the exact cause of the crash.  The evidence 
remaining at the crash site offered no explanation, spawning theories about bombs, 
sabotage, and assassination.  The suspects ranged from factions in the Panamanian 
military, Cuban intelligence, American business interests with the backing of the CIA, 
and the U.S. military.2  Conspiracy theories aside, the death of Torrijos resulted in a 
succession crisis, as several men vied to replace the Maximum Leader.     
                                                
1 “Panama Leader Killed in Crash In Bad Weather: Torrijos Plane Found,” New York 
Times, August 2, 1981. 
2 Noriega and Eisner, America’s Prisoner, 141-142; John Perkins Confessions of an 
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 Torrijos died at a transitional moment.  The ratification of the 1977 Carter-
Torrijos Treaty improved relations between the United States and Panama.  Panamanians 
felt vindicated, knowing they would finally gain control of the Canal.  The process 
would take twenty-two years, but this long delay had been grudgingly accepted.  
Resolution of the Canal Zone occurred on 1 October 1979, and Panama ceased being 
bifurcated by a de facto American colony.  U.S. military bases remained and a final 
decision on their future remained a lingering concern.  If no new agreement were 
reached, however, the bases would be returned on New Year’s Eve 1999, the scheduled 
handover of the Canal.3  Finally, Torrijos had made a gentleman’s agreement with 
President Carter that he would support a democratic transition. 4  The relationship 
between the United States and Panama appeared to be heading in a positive direction 
until Torrijos’ unexpected death. The resulting power vacuum threw the future of U.S.-
Panamanian relations in doubt. 
                                                                                                                                           
Economic Hit Man (San Francisco, CA, Berrett-Koehler Publishers, 2004). 156-157. In 
Getting to Know the General, Graham Greene at first dismissed any of the notions of a 
bomb plot when friends in Panama mentioned Torrijos had been assassinated, 187.  He 
reassessed this however in the epilogue when shown bombs used by the Contras in 
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3 Conniff, Panama and the United States, 137, 184. 
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that an agreed transition in Panama to a democratic government was an informal 
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Treaty.  
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 The president at the time, Aristides Royo, was a figurehead with no real power.  
In Panama, whoever controlled the military controlled the country.5  The immediate 
successor to Torrijos as the Chief of the Panamanian armed forces was Colonel 
Florencio Flores Aguilar.  Flores stayed in power for a year until Colonel Ruben Dario 
Paredes pushed him aside. Paredes also controlled the military for a year, when he 
resigned and attempted to run for President in 1984. 6  Manuel Antonio Noriega replaced 
Paredes as Chief of the Panamanian military and eventually became Maximum Leader.7   
A career military officer, Noriega became the chief of the G-2 Intelligence 
section in the Panamanian National Guard.  He reached that position and his eventual 
control of Panama through ruthlessness.  The illegitimate son of a civil servant and a 
maid, Noriega’s father never acknowledged him and his mother abandoned him at five 
years old.  Thereafter, a maternal aunt raised him in a poor section of Panama City.8  
Noriega had been an adequate student and hoped to become a doctor, but poverty and 
illegitimacy barred him from medicine.  Instead, Noriega secured an appointment to the 
Chorillos Military Academy in Lima, Peru, with the assistance of his paternal half-
brother, Luis Carlos Noriega Hurto, a member of the Panamanian diplomatic mission in 
                                                
5 Steve Albert, The Case Against the General: Manuel Noriega and the Politics of 
American Justice (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1993), 14. 
6 Frederick Kempe, Divorcing the Dictator, 113-118. 
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Peru.9  During his time at Chorillos, Noriega caught the attention of U.S. intelligence 
and while still a cadet in 1958 began receiving payments from the United States.10  After 
graduating from Chorillos in 1962, Noriega returned to Panama.   
Upon his return Noriega earned a commission and was assigned to an 
intelligence section at David in the Chiriquí province.11  While still a junior officer, 
Noriega attached himself to Omar Torrijos and sought the senior officer as a mentor.  
Noriega recalled, “Torrijos had a reputation of being an independent thinker and was 
well respected among new recruits like me.”12  Seeking out Torrijos helped Noriega’s 
                                                
9 Kempe, Divorcing the Dictator, 47-48. 
10 “Substitution Documents on Noriega Payments,” Panama: General (jan- June), OA/ID 
CFD 01577, William T. Pryce Files, National Security Council, Bush Presidential 
Record, George Bush Presidential Library (hereafter cited as GBPL).   
These documents were presented by the prosecution at Manuel Noriega’s trial on drug 
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seeking the original documents. During the trial and in his biography Noriega disputed 
the figures and claimed that the United States had actually paid him millions of dollars 
for intelligence services.  The documents show that the DoD continually paid Noriega 
between 1955 and 1986 with no break in payments.  The CIA had a break in payment to 
Noriega in 1977 and 1978 but otherwise paid him every year between 1955 and 1986.  
11 Roger W. Fontaine, “Who is Manuel Antonio Noriega” in Panama: An Assessment, 
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career.  The older officer “took him under his wing and groomed the young 
Lieutenant.”13 
 Noriega rose through the ranks and eventually headed an intelligence collection 
unit established with assistance from the United States military. Noriega received 
extensive training in intelligence gathering, counterinsurgency, interrogation and 
counterintelligence.   He attended classes at the School of the Americas in the Canal 
Zone and at Fort Bragg, North Carolina.  The training made him a valuable asset to both 
Torrijos and the United States, but also llowed him to gather information on rivals.  His 
position as intelligence chief aided him in his later takeover of power.14     
At the time of Torrijos’ death, Noriega was the Chief of Intelligence.  It seemed 
unlikely that he would become commander of the National Guard as several officers 
outranked him.  Yet through h shrewd maneuvering, he became head of the military and 
the de facto leader of Panama. Paredes planned to retire and run for the presidency in 
1984.15   Noriega offered to support Paredes if the retiring general designated Noriega 
commander of the National Guard.  In addition, the plan called for a power-sharing 
agreement between the commander and the President, weakening the military and taking 
a step towards civilian rule.  Paredes agreed, stepped down from command in 1983, and 
                                                
13 Dinges, Our Man in Panama, 31-34.  
14 Ibid., 34-38. 
15 St. Malo and Harris, Panamanian Problem, 45.  
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supported Noriega as his successor. Once in power, Noriega marginalized Paredes.16 In 
the end Nicolas Ardito Barletta became the new president in an election that 
international observers considered fraudulent.17  The commander of the Panamanian 
military remained in control of the state, the elected president stayed a figurehead, and 
the notion of power sharing vanished.18 
The 1984 elections presented a dilemma for the Reagan Administration since 
Arnulfo Arias Madrid, the president ousted in the 1968 coup, led the opposition party.   
The Administration considered him unfit for the presidency and feared that if he won the 
election, the Panamanian National Guard would depose him again.  Noriega encouraged 
this assessment.19  Though the elections were a blatant fraud, the lack of U.S. criticism 
created the impression of an American endorsement for Noriega.20  
 Once in command of the National Guard, Noriega restructured the government 
and the armed forces.  He isolated popular officers and potential rivals by giving them 
ambassadorships or other foreign military postings.21   He merged all branches of the 
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military into one service under his command and named it the  Panamanian Defense 
Force (PDF).  Training increased and several paramilitary units were formed whose 
abilities went beyond maintaining civil order and defending the Panama Canal.  One of 
the new units, Los Machos del Monte, trained in light infantry tactics, jungle fighting, 
and guerilla warfare.  They were fiercely loyal to Noriega.22  The PDF developed closer 
ties to the U.S. military by buying more American-made weapons.23  Noriega also 
expanded the role of the military.  Soldiers became responsible for traffic enforcement, 
customs and borders protection, and other functions usually associated with civilian 
bureaucracies.24  These actions strengthened the grip of the military at the expense of the 
already weak civilian institutions.25  
The United States showed ambivalence toward Noriega’s consolidation of 
power.  Noriega had long been on the payroll of the United States Intelligence 
Community.  What he provided in return for payment remains classified, but the 
Department of Defense and the CIA paid him $320,000 dollars over the course of thirty 
                                                
22 Their loyalty to Noriega stemmed in part to the benefits he provided the soldiers.  
These included tote bags that said “Machos Del Monte” and allowed them special access 
to seats on public transportation and discounts on goods and services. 
23 Harding, Military Foundations of Panamanian Politics, 162.  
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25 Harding, Military Foundations of Panamanian Politics, 156. 
 
   67 
years.26  This did not make Noriega a loyal ally.27  According to Colin Powell, “You 
could not buy Manuel Noriega, but you could rent him.” 28 Noriega took money not only 
from the United States, but also from the Cubans, the Soviets, and Colombian Drug 
Cartels.29   
Noriega’s role in drug trafficking raised question and in 1985 the U.S. 
Department of Justice began investigating him.  As the highest-ranking soldier in the 
Panamanian military Noriega earned $2,000 dollars a month.  This was nowhere near 
enough to finance a lifestyle that included a yacht, a BMW 750, and private planes.30  
The investigations led to an indictment against Noriega for drug trafficking in 1987 but 
only after public pressure compelled the Reagan Administration.    
The relationship between the United States government and the Noriega regime 
publicly soured after the New York Times published an exposé by Seymour Hersh.  
Hersh had famously reported on the My Lai Massacre in Vietnam.  He went on to 
become a staff writer for the New York Times and the New Yorker, and had a reputation 
for exposing major scandals.31   The June 1986 article brought Noriega to the attention 
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of the American public.  Hersh alleged that Noriega was involved in drug trafficking, 
arms running and selling intelligence to the United States, Cuba and the Soviet Union.  
Hersh contended, “General Noriega's activities [were] a potential national security threat 
because of the strategic importance of Panama and the Panama Canal.” The article 
concluded, “Many American officials, despite their hostility to General Noriega's 
involvement in [drug trafficking], expressed admiration for his ability to keep his various 
constituencies—such as the United States and Cuba—at bay.”32 Hersh’s article marked a 
turning point in the relationship.  
Noriega had supported counterdrug missions flying out of U.S. military bases in 
Panama, and the Drug Enforcement Agency’s Joint Inter-Agency Task Force 
headquartered at Howard Air Force Base, Panama.   The same day that the New York 
Times published Hersh’s article, Noriega received a medal at Fort McNair from the 
Inter-American Defense Board for Panama’s support to counterdrug missions.33  The 
timing was less than ideal and showed how Noriega had played both sides by facilitating 
drug shipments while helping counterdrug operations.  It also revealed the ignorance of 
US government officals.  
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The Defense Department and the CIA ended payments to Noriega after 
publication of the Hersh article. 34  The Justice Department’s investigation was fast-
tracked and on 17 July 1987 indictments for drug trafficking and money laundering were 
filed in Federal courts in Miami and Tampa against Noriega.35  The Reagan 
Administration used the indictments to encourage Noriega to step down from power.  By 
1988 his requirement that the indictments be thrown out became politically unacceptable 
in the United States. Vice President Bush was campaigning for the Presidency in 1988 
and his political opponents made Noriega a campaign issue.  So the Reagan 
Administration changed its policies to force Noriega to step down.36  
 In April 1988 the President Reagan signed Executive Order 12635.  It imposed 
economic sanctions that stopped payments from the Panama Canal Commission, and 
prevented any “direct or indirect payments or transfers from the United States to the 
Noriega regime.”37  From that moment forward, “all U.S. citizens in Panama had to 
cease payments to Panamanians.”38  The sanctions made it illegal for all American 
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citizens residing in Panama to pay their rents, buy goods, and engage in most business 
transactions.39  Clearly, the second and third order effects of EO 12635 had not been 
considered, as thousands of American citizens were forced to choose between following 
American law or alienating their Panamanian hosts.40 EO 12635 and the indictments 
were seen as a ploy to encourage Noriega to relinquish power since the United States did 
not have an extradition treaty with Panama.41  The Panamanian president at the time, 
Eric Delvalle, used the indictments as a pretext to fire Noriega as Commander of the 
PDF. Noriega ignored the order and instead ousted the president from office, replacing 
him with the more amenable Manuel Solis Palma.42   
 While the Reagan Administration worked to reach an agreement with Noriega, 
the 1988 presidential campaign had been ongoing.  Vice President George Bush, a 
candidate, faced accusations that he had known of Noriega’s wrongdoing since at least 
1976, when he served as the Director of Central Intelligence.  No conclusive evidence 
directly linked Noriega to Bush.  However, this did not stop political innuendo and 
mudslinging during the Republican primaries. Republicans Bob Dole and Jack Kemp 
both accused the Vice President of having been either oblivious to Noriega’s crimes or 
acquiescent.  If elected they would deal with Noriega to ensure that a dictator did not 
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gain control of the Panama Canal, when the United States turned it over in eleven years, 
something they asserted Bush was incapable of doing.43  The issue did not derail the 
Bush campaign during the primaries and he was able to stave-off his Republican 
challengers.  
 Accusations resurfaced during the general election and Governor Michael 
Dukakis, the Democratic candidate, tried several times to make Noriega and his ties to 
Bush a campaign issue.  During the first presidential debate Dukakis stated that the 
United States under Reagan had been “dealing with a drug-running Panamanian 
dictator.” He went on to attack the Vice President by stating  “if our government itself is 
doing business with people who we know are engaged in drug profiteering and drug 
trafficking… that sends out a very, very bad message.”  In his rebuttal, Bush avoided 
addressing Dukakis’s comments and instead implied the governor had potentially 
compromised classified information.44  The Vice President then went on to say “seven 
Administrations” dealt ”with Mr. Noriega” and “it was the Reagan-Bush Administration 
that brought this man to justice.”  While true that the CIA and Department of Defense 
had Noriega on their payrolls since 1958, it was unlikely either Eisenhower or Kennedy 
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were briefed on an obscure Panamanian Cadet.45 Bush then went on to say, “there was 
no evidence that Mr. Noriega was involved in drugs, no hard evidence until we indicted 
him.”  Bush admitted that he had met Noriega, but this occurred when Bush recived the 
Panamanian president, Noriega was merely in attendance.  In his closing remarks, 
Governor Dukakis tried to link Noriega to Bush by saying “the Administration has been 
doing business with Noriega. Has made him a part of our foreign policy.”  He warned 
“You cannot make concessions to terrorists. If you do, you invite the taking of more 
hostages.”46  
 After the debate, the Dukakis campaign tried once more to paint Bush as 
complicit in Noriega’s actions. A commercial began airing 21 September 1988 that 
showed Bush meeting with Noriega.  It stated, “In 1982 George Bush was made 
responsible for stopping drug traffic from coming into this country.  What happened?  
Cocaine traffic up 300%, more drugs in our classroom, and Panamanian drug lord 
Noriega kept on the government payroll. That’s the George Bush record on drug 
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control.”47  The efforts by the Dukakis campaign, like those in the primaries, did not 
harm Bush’s Presidential campaign.  However, they did highlight U.S. involvement with 
Noriega. 
 George Herbert Walker Bush was inaugurated the forty-first President of the 
United States on 20 January 1989.  The issue of Panama loomed throughout his first 
year.  Economic sanctions and a criminal indictment had failed to convince Noriega to 
step down from power. The sanctions crippled the Panamanian economy and created 
resentment against American citizens in Panama, who were not meeting their financial 
obligations. At the same time the Bush Administration dealt with Noriega, the Cold War 
began to thaw.  Eastern Europe separated from the Soviet sphere of influence, protests in 
Tiananmen Square rocked China, and anti-communist struggles in Central America were 
ending.  Throughout these events the Bush Administration had appeared unable to deal 
with a tiny country often portrayed as the creation of the United States and a region seen 
as an American territory since 1903.48  Panama also had the fourth largest expatriate 
population of American citizens aside from West Germany, the United Kingdom, and 
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Japan.49  Instead of exerting decisive influence, the President spent the next year facing 
accusations of being a “wimp” in matters of foreign policy.50  
 The first piece of cited as evidence for the “wimp” image was the failure of the 
President to stop harassment of American citizens in Panama.  In the United States, the 
Washington Post and Christian Science Monitor reported on the harassment.51  The 20 
March 1989 Army Times cover story “Terror In Panama” exposed the attacks on 
American citizens.  The story highlighted a pattern of assaults on service members and 
their families by the Panamanian military.  The first occurred when a U.S. Navy Petty 
Officer was stopped at a roadblock, kidnapped, robbed and left in the jungles outside of 
Panama City. 52  The second, more sensational incident occurred on 3 March 1989.  
Twenty-one buses carrying American children from U.S. military bases to their schools 
were stopped at a checkpoint manned by Panamanian soldiers and held at gunpoint.  The 
soldiers accused the buses of not having the appropriate Panamanian registration, which 
the U.S. buses did not have because economic sanctions prevented them from paying the 
Panamanian government for them.  The soldiers then tried to tow the buses with the 
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children still on board.  A standoff ensued when U.S. Army soldiers were called in.  
Hundreds of children remained onboard, surrounded by heavily armed men.53  American 
embassy officials negotiated an end to the standoff without violence. The school bus 
incident and other provocations throughout 1987 and 1988 were clearly part of an 
“escalating pattern of harassment against US personnel.” The articles concluded that the 
President, the Joint Chiefs, and officials in Washington had ignored the threats and not 
protected American citizens. 54  An American officer told the Christian Science Monitor, 
“You want to react.  But what can you do that wouldn’t put Americans even more at 
risk.”55  This was the dilemma facing President Bush.  Political pressure forced him to 
act yet U.S. actions had done little except place hundreds of American school children in 
danger. 
 Noriega calculated that the pattern of harassment would intimidate the Bush 
Administration.  The CIA provided the President with a report that highlighted how 
Noriega organized his harassment campaign.  It warned, “Incidents involving US 
personnel are numerous but there has been an increase in both number and seriousness in 
the last two months.”  The goal of this harassment was to “force Washington to rethink 
economic sanctions” prior to a statutory review of EO 12635 in April 1989.  In addition 
the CIA warned that the harassment might “fan anti-US and nationalist sentiment” 
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among Panamanians.  The report continued, “Noriega may also calculate that the 
increasing use of harassment will provoke a US reaction” that would anger 
Panamanians.  Nationalist anger could then be used to his advantage.  The report warned 
that Noriega was likely to “continue and possibly escalate his present effort to make life 
difficult for US personnel.”56   
 Harassment led to a proposal to isolate U.S. Military bases from Panama, similar 
to the barriers that separated Guantanamo Naval Base from Cuba.  The administration 
quickly dismissed the plan because the bases were not connected and a majority of 
facilities such as hospitals, commissaries, and even Quarry Heights (U.S. Southern 
Command headquarters) would remain in territory under Panamanian jurisdiction.57   A 
democratic transition seemed to be the best means to resolve the issue and bring about a 
peaceable transfer of power.  Panama scheduled presidential elections to occur on 7 May 
1989.58   
 Unlike the 1984 election, the 1989 election appeared likely to be open and fair 
since Noriega invited international election monitors.  The possibility existed that if the 
vote went against Noriega he would be isolated and the military’s grip on power would 
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be weakened, allowing for Panama to transition to a democratic government from one of 
overt military rule.59  The CIA warned on 24 April 1989, however, that “without major 
U.S. initiative,” Noriega would be able to “reassert his hold on power in Panama” 
regardless of the election results.  The Panamanian people “would accept” fraud and “the 
election would strengthen his position in the Defense Forces.”60  The CIA also warned 
that regardless of election results, nothing “will convince Noriega to end his harassment 
campaign” against American citizens.  Thus President Bush could expect harassment to 
escalate unless he recognized Noriega’s political appointees or ended economic 
sanctions.61  Despite the CIA’s pessimistic reports, the Bush Administration had high 
hopes for the elections.   
 The international election monitors sent to Panama included the National 
Democratic Institute (NDI), a non-profit NGO formed in 1983 to promote democratic 
government and fair elections.  The organization previously monitored the 1987 election 
in the Philippines that ended the reign of Ferdinand Marcos.  The presence of outside 
elections monitors seemed to indicate that the elections would be free and fair. Former 
U.S. President Carter led the NDI delegation, because as Ken Wollack, executive Vice-
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President for NDI, stated, “it would be impossible for Noriega to say no to Jimmy 
Carter.” The former president remained popular in Panama for having supported the 
ratification of the 1977 Torrijos-Carter Treaty.62 A separate delegation of U.S. 
Congressmen and Senators also went.   
 The Congressional delegation flew to Howard Air Force Base and toured U.S. 
military installations.  When the group planned to leave American controlled territory 
General Frederick Woerner, the Commander of U.S. Southern Command (CINCSO), 
warned that he could not prevent their detention if they entered Panama without prior 
approval.  He would make every effort to prevent or minimize their detention, but 
because they had entered a sovereign nation illegally the U.S. military could not directly 
interfere.63  The group was not detained, but they reported to the White House that 
“[Southern command] was part of the problem, not part of the solution.”  U.S. Secretary 
of State James Baker recalled that Senator John McCain in particular complained about 
Woerner’s timid attitude.64    
 Despite negative perceptions, Woerner had a great deal of experience in Panama 
and Latin America.  His career had been divided between infantry assignments and 
attaché postings throughout Latin America.  He was fluent in Spanish, had a Master’s 
degree in Latin American history, and had been the Army War College director of Latin 
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American studies.  The General also attended the Uruguayan War College in 1969, 
resulting in close personal ties with senior military officers throughout the Western 
Hemisphere.   His familiarity with the region made him ideal to lead U.S. Southern 
Command’s diplomatic mission.  But the White House and Congress did not see 
Woerner’s handling of Noriega as forceful enough.65  U.S. Southern Command appeared 
ineffectual and American citizens in Panama and the visiting Senators gave General 
Woerner the moniker “Wimp Woerner.”66  The criticism against General Woerner was 
unfair since the White House had ordered him to avoid an escalation.67      
 The elections began without incident, but within hours it appeared that Noriega’s 
chosen candidate, Carlos Duque, had lost. Ballot boxes were immediately seized, and 
Duque declared the victor.  A report by the NDI delegation spoke of a myriad of 
intimidation tactics undertaken by Noriega’s regime and preparations for election fraud 
such as the stacking of ballots in favor of Duque appeared obvious.68  When election 
fraud became apparent, Carter called a press conference the next day.  He made it clear 
the elections were not free and fair. Noriega’s candidates won through deception.69  
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 The situation worsened over the next few days when a paramilitary group loyal 
to Noriega called “Dobermans” attacked Guillermo Endara, the projected winner, and 
his two vice presidents during protest marches. The “Dobermans” beat one of the Vice-
Presidential candidates, Billy Ford, with sticks and shot his bodyguard.  News agencies 
worldwide published a photograph of Ford covered in blood with his hands up, while a 
man attacked him with a stick.  The candidates fled, with Endara seeking refuge in the 
Papal Nunciature and the two vice presidents on a U.S. Military base.70  The United 
States and the Organization of American States (OAS) condemned the subversion of the 
democratic process to little effect.  The Panamanian election commission declared 
Noriega’s candidate the winner.71  As the CIA had warned, Noriega engaged in blatant 
fraud yet remained in power. 
 The elections were the final hope to peacefully improve relations between the 
United States and Panama. President Bush had authorized Carter to negotiate with 
Noriega after the election to consider going into exile in Spain, which did not have an 
extradition treaty.  Madrid showed a willingness to welcome what it considered “people 
from the colonies.”72  At a press conference President Bush condemned the fraudulent 
election.  When asked about Panama he said “[Noreiga] knows my position” and “if he 
does leave we would have the instant restoration of normal relations with Panama. That 
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has been conveyed to him very, very recently.”73  When asked if the indictments would 
be dropped, President Bush stated, “I'm not going to do that. That has profound 
implications for our fight against narcotics, which has got to be worldwide.”  When 
asked about the threat to American citizens the President stated, “I will do what is 
necessary to protect the lives of American citizens.”  He continued by saying “we will 
not be intimidated by the bullying tactics, brutal though they may be, of the dictator, 
Noriega.”  Near the end of the press conference a reported asked, “Are you concerned 
about [Noriega] taking hostages.”  The President reemphasized that, “I'm concerned 
about protecting the lives of Americans.”74   
 At the time of the May elections, 51,305 American citizens lived in Panama.  
Only 10,130 were U.S. military personnel, and there was only one combat unit, the 193rd 
Infantry Brigade. 75  The 193rd reported directly to the Commander of U.S. Southern 
Command but were only trained to defend the Canal.  The majority of U.S. military 
members worked as Foreign Area Officers and planners.  U.S. Southern Command 
primarily conducted military-to-military relations by liaising with Latin America armed 
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forces. They had not conducted major military operations. The rest of the American 
citizens in Panama were spouses and children of military members, Department of 
Defense civilians, American workers in the PCC, and retirees—the very people to target.  
 Economic sanctions remained ineffective and a political solution vanished 
following the fraudulent elections.  A direct military intervention appeared to be the 
remaining course of action, so the United States military and U.S. Southern Command 
revised ELABORATE MAZE, the 1986 contingency plan to defend the Canal.  The 
revision represented a radical departure from U.S. Southern Command’s previous plans, 
which presumed the Panamanian military would support the United States.  The new 
plan considered the Panamanian Military the adversary.  It focused on two concerns: 
preventing sabotage of the Panama Canal and protecting American citizens in Panama.76    
 Woerner’s plan had four separate phases.  The first phase, KLONDIKE KEY, 
established “assembly areas in Panama City and Colón” and called “for evacuation to the 
United States” of non-combat personnel and civilians.”  The second phase, POST TIME, 
slowly increased the amount of U.S. troops in the country to intimidate the Panamanian 
military and encourage a coup against Noriega, negating a direct U.S. military 
intervention.  If an overt threat against American Citizens occurred, then the third phase, 
BLUE SPOON, would commence.  This phase would be “a joint offensive operation to 
defeat and dismantle the Panama Defense Force while protecting U.S. lives, U.S. 
property, and the Canal.”  But would occur only after “the slow deliberate placement of 
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troops in Panama . . . over a two-week period.”  The final phase, BLIND LOGIC, 
planned for U.S. troops in Panama to establish civil control after a coup or combat. 
Ultimately the plan sought to create a new Panamanian government that would 
“reconstruct the PDF, reducing its size and powers and institutionalizing its loyalty to 
civilian authority and democratic government.”77 
 During the summer of 1989 while the OAS attempted to mediate the elections, 
the United States slowly began to build up its forces in Panama as part of POST TIME.78  
By July the White House had lost confidence in Woerner and became frustrated with his 
slow, methodical pace.  The General had followed orders to not provoke Noriega, but he 
appeared unsuited to lead a direct military intervention in Panama.  Instead, the 
overzealous General Maxwell Thurman, who had no knowledge of Latin America, 
replaced Woerner on 1 October 1989.79        
 At the same time the White House announced a change of command in U.S. 
Southern Command, it issued National Security Directive 17 on 22 July 1989.  The 
directive authorized “military actions designed to assert U.S. treaty rights in Panama and 
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to keep Noriega and his supporters off guard.”80  It increased the number of troops and 
evacuated military dependents from Panama.  Between May and December 1989, the 
United States evacuated 15,805 nonessential American citizens.  The directive also 
recalled all military personnel onto bases, which had limited housing for families, and no 
accommodations for bachelor officers.  Nonetheless tensions off base required a 
relocation.81   
 U.S. policy had encouraged the removal of Noriega from power.  The policies 
had failed.  Economic sanctions made American citizens a target of hostility.  
Supporiting elections to bring a peaceful democratic transition had been squashed with 
the fraudulent elections of May 1989.  Besides a U.S. military intervention the only 
policy remining to the United States was to encourage a military coup against Noriega 
by the PDF.  As anticipated in U.S. Southern Command’s contingency plan, PRAYER 
BOOK.    
 On 3 October 1989 Major Moisés Giroldi Vega, the commander of the PDF 4th 
Infantry Company, led a coup.82 Giroldi told the CIA about the coup and they had high 
hopes for its success.  General Thurman, in contrast, expressed his doubts, since the 
coup occurred three days after he took command of U.S. Southern Command.  The 
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General suspected that the coup was a ploy to embarrass him.83  General Colin Powell, 
who had also taken over as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff two days earlier, 
shared Thurman’s hesitation.  The United States knew little about Giroldi and the few 
facts that the CIA confirmed were not reassuring.  Giroldi had been seen as a Noriega 
loyalist up to that point, having put down a coup the previous year.  His plans for 
Panama after the coup were a mystery.  Powell recalled, “we did not want to replace one 
military dictator with another.”84   
 The coup plotters received the blessing of the United States, but were told that 
U.S. military forces would not take a direct part.  The coup began well enough, with the 
capture of Noriega at the PDF headquarters at the Comandancia, but quickly unraveled.  
Giroldi planned to ask Noriega to step down and go into exile.  This did not occur and a 
tense stand off ensued until Noriega called the Machos Del Monte, stationed in Rio 
Hato, as reinforcements.85 They stormed the Comandancia and the plotters surrendered 
after a gun battle. With the failure of the 3 October coup, it seemed that all options had 
been exhausted.  At this point the plan to carry out Operation BLUE SPOON had been 
revised and Thurman put an accelerated timetable into place with the military planning 
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effort being assumed by the XVIII Airborne Corps in Fort Bragg because Thurman did 
not feel U.S. Southern Command had the ability to plan a large-scale military invasion.86 
The failed October coup brought recrimination against U.S. Southern Command 
and the Bush Administration.  At best, critics in Washington viewed President Bush as 
an incompetent who deserved the “wimp” moniker; at worst, he was coddling a drug-
dealing dictator, who had incriminating evidence against him and the CIA.  The options 
facing the Bush Administration dwindled, as diplomatic pressure from the OAS seemed 
unlikely to dislodge Noriega.  Economic sanctions had a limited impact and only 
succeeded in alienating Panamanians, as American citizens did not pay their bills.  In 
fact the policy to open military shopettes to American citizens appeared a return of the 
reviled commisario of the Canal Zone days. Finally a coup against Noriega, the main 
goal of ELABORATE MAZE, failed.  This left the Bush Administration with limited 
options as political pressure built. U.S. Congressmen and Senators called for a freezing 
of the Canal Treaty until Panama elected a democratic government.  Such an action 
would have thrown Panama into chaos and stoked nationalist sentiments, an outcome 
Noriega desired.87  In the end the United States used military force to remove Noriega 
from power, returning to the precedents of the nineteenth century.  This was merely the 
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means to an end, the protection of the American citizens in Panama.  The only way these 
ends could come about however was through military force.  Political, diplomatic, and 
economic pressure had not convinced Noriega to step down.  In fact, they worsened the 
situation. 
   88 
CHAPTER V  
THE DECISION TO USE FORCE 
The primary objective of the PRAYER BOOK contingency plan had been to 
encourage the Panamanian military to abandon Noriega.  The coup’s failure placed the 
Bush Administration in a difficult position.1  Both Democrats and Republicans criticized 
the Administration for failing to oust Noriega.  Some likened the failure to the 1961 Bay 
of Pigs fiasco, when President John F. Kennedy declined to support Cuban exiles 
attempting to overthrow Fidel Castro with U.S. air support. Congressman Les Aspin (D-
WI), Chairman of the House Armed Services committee, claimed that the Bush 
Administration and U.S. Southern Command “did not seize the moment.''  Congressman 
Dave McCurdy (D-OK) said, “it would apparently have been relatively easy to support 
the rebels, but the Administration blinked,” and, “Yesterday makes Jimmy Carter look 
like a man of resolve.  There's a resurgence of the wimp factor.”2  
 Senator Jesse Helms (R-NC), the ranking Republican on the Senate Armed 
Services committee, had often denounced the U.S. policy towards Panama as being too 
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accommodating.  Helms said that the Administration had reacted like a bunch of 
“Keystone Kops.”3  A long time opponent of the 1977 Panama Canal Treaty, Helms 
used any opportunity to show that Panamanian leaders could not be trusted to control the 
Canal and, thus, the United States should abrogate the treaty.  The failed coup allowed 
him to gain support in Congress.4  He also led an anti-Noriega coalition in Congress that 
criticized the Administration. The coalition saw bipartisan support with both Democrats 
and Republicans criticizing the President and demanding a solution.5  The safety of 
American citizens remained a secondary concern to them.   
Helms used the crisis as an argument to nullify or at least delay the Canal Treaty 
until a democratic government replaced Noriega.  Many in Washington thought that 
democracy had been a precondition for turning over the Canal.  Former President Carter, 
however, admitted that such as agreement had been reached informal.6  Any change to 
the treaty would have angered Panamanians and allowed Noriega to stoke nationalist 
sentiments.  Some Senators came to Bush’s defense, including Senator Christopher J. 
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Dodd (D-CT), head of the Western Hemisphere subcommittee of the Senate Foreign 
Relations committee.  He said “They hate Noriega in Panama, but abrogate the treaty 
and they'd build monuments to him in every village.''7  
Noriega used failed coup to close ranks by purging the military.  He order ten 
officers executed and jailed seventy-seven with questionable loyalty.8 The message was 
clear: disloyalty would be severely punished.  After the failed October coup, the 
likelihood of the military turning against Noriega vanished.  The U.S. contingency plan 
now entered into the only remaining option to deal with Noriega—a direct U.S. military 
intervention.  
General Thurman ordered the limited withdrawal of military families with small 
children.9  Between May and December 1989, the U.S. military evacuated 15,805 
American citizens.  These evacuations were not part of the planned large-scale 
evacuation. In addition to the limited evacuation of noncombatants, Thurman rehearsed 
the large-scale evacuation of all American citizens in Panama and ensured they all knew 
the location of their extraction point.10   The Bush Administration and U.S. Southern 
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Command had to handle the evacuation carefully since it could not appear that a large-
scale withdrawal was underway, which would have been interpreted as weakness both at 
home and abroad. Admiral William Crowe, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff prior 
to Colin Powell, asked Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney to transfer U.S. Southern 
Command’s headquarters to Florida, allowing the CINCSO to focus on the rest of Latin 
America.  Cheney flatly rejected the idea because, “No matter how it was dressed up, it 
would look like the United States was running.  Just can’t do it, no matter what the 
merits.”11      
An exodus of Americans could have been perceived as the Bush Administration 
abandoning Panama. In 1977 President Carter’s critics accused him of giving away the 
Canal.12  Now, if President Bush ordered a large-scale evacuation of Americans from a 
region that ten years earlier had been considered part of the United States, he would have 
been condemned for surrendering to Noriega.  The international perception likely played 
a role as well, since an American departure might have complicated the still ongoing the 
Cold War, though history has shown it was beginning to end.13  The evacuation of the 
United States from Panama would have lent an image of weakness on the international 
stage.  For this reason the Bush Administration downplayed the limited evacuation of 
Americans.   
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Thurman also prepared U.S. Southern Command for war by injecting a warrior 
spirit.14  First he required all military members under his command to wear the 
camouflage Battle Dress Uniform, instead of the more formal service dress that had been 
the standard.  Thurman thought U.S. Southern Command “didn’t have the horsepower, 
staff or communications to run any large contingency operations.”15  Thurman looked to 
revise the contingency plan and in particular the combat phase, BLUE SPOON. The 
revision focused on the rapid deployment of U.S. troops into Panama from the United 
States.  Instead of bringing forces in over a two-week period, he called for a lighting fast 
strike using airborne troops.16  He had also shifted military planning from U.S. Southern 
Command to the XVIII Airborne Corps at Fort Bragg.17  His experience as commander 
of the Army’s Training and Doctrine Command meant that Thurman was familiar with 
the modern capabilities of the U.S. Army and the feasibility of a large-scale airborne 
assault.18  In order to prepare for military action, Thurman had U.S. troops run a series of 
field training exercises.  
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General Thurman had his staff begin rehearsing the execution of Operation 
BLUE SPOON.  He wanted every detail refined “to a cat’s eye.”  In order to get this 
level of detail the General had his staff “rehearse [the combat phase] every two months” 
telling them this would continue “for the next ten years.”19 The U.S. military spent the 
October and November in a constant series of exercises.  The exercises were broken into 
two parts.  First, large-scale maneuvers that rehearsed joint operations, which included 
seizing military objectives, securing bases and protecting American citizens.20 The 
second, called for a series of small exercises that involved individual Army and Marine 
units.   
During October and November the United States military conducted five large 
and forty-four small exercises.21  The increased activity strained the troops and military 
staffs. U.S. Southern Command still maintained its responsibility for supporting U.S. 
interests in the whole of Latin America and the Caribbean while it prepared for combat.  
Moving into December, military exercises declined as the Christmas holidays 
approached. The Panamanians relaxed for the holidays and Noriega recalled, “My troops 
had been reduced for the holidays; our bases had skeleton staffs.”22  
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Any notion of a break for the holidays vanished on 15 December when Noriega 
spoke to the Panamanian General Assembly.  First he declared himself “Maximum 
Leader of Panama.” The assembly approved the measure.23  Omar Torrijos had taken the 
same title.  By appropriating it Noriega hoped to inspire nationalist sentiments against 
the United States. 24  His next statement declared Panama to be in “a state of war so long 
as the United States continues its policy of aggression.”  The fiery rhetoric and language 
was meant for a Panamanian audience to build support for Noriega and condemn the 
past two months of U.S. military exercises.  He continued, “We Panamanians will sit on 
the banks of the Canal to watch the dead bodies of our enemies pass by, but never would 
we destroy the Canal.” 25   Finally, he issued arrest warrants for two U.S. officers, Major 
General Marc Cisneros, the Army South Commander, and General Thurman, for crimes 
against Panama.26  The Bush Administration limited its response to the speech. U.S. 
Secretary of State James Baker recalled, “Our initial reaction was to downplay these 
actions as rhetorical posturing.”27  U.S. Southern Command maintained its security 
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measures and implemented limited curfews for all military personnel and dependents.28  
The next day on 16 December the situation escalated with the death of an American 
citizen. 
 On the evening of 16 December four U.S. military officers assigned to the U.S. 
Southern Command Operations section (J-3) travelled towards Panama City.  They 
stopped at a Panamanian Defense Forces (PDF) roadblock, turned around and were fired 
upon.  The incident left one officer, Marine First Lieutenant Roberto Paz, dead and 
another wounded.  Witnessing this event were Naval Lieutenant (jg) Adam Curtis and 
his wife Bonnie.  The Curtises were detained and released after several hours.   
  The official debriefing sent to the White House from U.S. Southern Command 
stated that the four officers were heading into Panama City to have dinner at the Marriott 
Hotel.  They became lost and were stopped at a military roadblock near the 
Comandancia in the Chorillo neighborhood.  Panamanian soldiers attempted to drag the 
officers out of their car and place them under arrest.   Fearful and “believing that their 
lives were threatened” the four turned their car around and fled from the roadblock.  
PDF soldiers shot at them.  U.S. Southern Command reported this version of events back 
to the Pentagon and the White House in the official debriefing of the officers.  If the 
officers had been part of an organized provocation by the U.S. military, the official 
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debriefing would likely have mentioned this.  Instead, the version released to the press 
mirrored the classified debrief.29   
 Doubts have been raised regarding the justification for the invasion and the 
Armed Forces Journal International and the Los Angeles Times reported another version 
of events three years after the invasion.  The two publications stated that the officers 
were part of a group called the “hard chargers” and planned to provoke the PDF to 
justify military action.30  Noriega raised similar doubts about the official story since 
“American military personnel were restricted to base and were not allowed out to go to a 
movie or a restaurant.”  How  “could they have gotten so lost to drive right up to the 
Panamanian military command headquarters raised more questions than it answered.”31  
The four officers were part of U.S. Southern Command and not subject to the restrictions 
against liberty and the stricter curfews troops deployed to Panama as part of Task Force 
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Panama were under.  Their travel to the Marriot was not suspicious.32  Even Fidel Castro 
offered a version of events saying, ““They say that the Panamanians killed an unarmed 
soldier, but everyone knows that the soldiers had been in the bars of Panama. They were 
drunk, and who doesn't know what Yankee soldiers do when they are drunk.”33 The 
officers could have lied during the official debriefing, but if there had been any doubts in 
their story it would likely have been mentioned in the official report.  The debate over 
what the four officers were doing also seems moot, as the other part of the incident, the 
detention and assault of Lieutenant Curtis and his wife, has never been questioned.  
 Having been stopped at the opposite end of the road, the Curtises witnessed the 
shooting. Their testimony corroborated the three surviving officers the description of 
events.  The American car did not fire at the PDF soldiers. The soldiers manning the 
roadblock detained the couple at a police station for several hours.  While detained, the 
couple was separated and each threatened.  Panamanian soldiers assaulted Lt. Curtis, 
kicking him several times in the groin, and threatened him with execution for being a 
spy.  At the same time, the soldiers told his wife that her husband had been castrated. 
They then sexually assaulted her.  After several hours both were released. The assault of 
the Curtis family has never been disputed nor their presence at a PDF roadblock near the 
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Comandancia questioned. 34   The official debriefing again agreed with the version that 
the Bush Administration released to the press.     
   These two incidents were the tipping point that led to a direct military 
intervention.  The reaction by U.S. policymakers was swift.  Colin Powell saw the 
incident as “an unprovoked escalation” that “represented an increasing pattern of 
hostility toward U.S. Troops.”35  Powell presented the incidents to the Secretary Cheney 
and tried to decide whether it was an “un-ignorable provocation.”36  Both men agreed, 
that it was and presented this viewpoint to the President.  President Bush said that the 
idea that the officers had shot at anyone was “Bull.” According to those present, the 
assault of Bonnie Curtis angered the President in particular because of her status as a 
noncombatant. 37  He made the decision on “Sunday afternoon,” 17 December 1989, to 
“put into motion a major use of force to get Noriega out.”  But worried about the “loss of 
American life.”38   
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 The harassment of American citizens in Panama had increased over the past year. 
U.S. policy focused on pressuring Noriega to resign and he responded by threatening 
American citizens.  Once it became clear that there was no way to resolve the situation 
in Panama without force the U.S. President approved the implementation of the 
Operation BLUE SPOON.  President Bush accepted that “World opinion would be 
difficult, but I decided to send a cable to the OAS [sic] saying that what happened was 
unacceptable…the Soviet reaction will probably be negative… Certainly some of the 
Central Americans will be very wary.”39 In spite of the possible negative repercussions, 
the President ordered the invasion of Panama.     
 The military intervention had Presidential approval.  Generals Powell and 
Thurman decided however to rename the operation.  Thurman considered the original 
name “Blue Spoon” undignified and Powell agreed saying, “You do not risk people’s 
lives for Blue Spoons.” Thurman suggested ”Just Cause” and Powell concurred since 
“even our harshest critics would have to utter ‘Just Cause’ while denouncing us.”40   
 The U.S. military implemented the renamed plan on 17 December 1989.  
Planners had concluded that they would need about forty-eight hours to put all the forces 
in place and launch the invasion.  They set the morning of 20 December as D-Day and 
H-Hour at 0100.  The next two days saw frantic preparations in the United States as the 
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XVIII Airborne Corps recalled personnel and the U.S. Air Force Mobility Air Command 
prepared to transport troops.  In Panama American citizens were not authorized to travel 
off base unless on official business, and anyone living off base had to prepare to 
evacuate to a military base with limited notice.41  Military forces built full-scale mock-
ups of buildings to engage in detailed rehearsals.42  In Fort Bragg, the home of the XVIII 
Airborne Corps, commanders cancelled all leaves.  As troops were being mobilized, the 
U.S. military took pains to prevent word about the invasion from getting out and 
eliminating the element of surprise.   
 On 20 December Operation Just Cause was underway.  The first missions were 
an assault on Noriega’s yachts and jet to prevent his escape, the dropping of laser guided 
bombs next to the Rio Hato army barracks, and a rescue operation of an American held 
by the Panamanian military.  The prisoner was Kurt Muse, a military dependent and CIA 
contractor, arrested in April for setting up a pirate radio station critical of the Noriega 
regime.  Noriega had warned that if the United States used military force, Muse would 
be the first American to die.43  Muse had generated some media attention and war 
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planners developed a rescue operation to prevent Muse’s execution.44 When the 
operation succeeded, Muse was freed.45  
 At the same time as the rescue of Kurt Muse took place, special operations forces 
also cut off any potential escape routes available to Noriega.  The first phase targeted 
Noriega’s two yachts named Macho del Monte I and II, which were blown up in Balboa 
harbor.46  The first objective was destroyed with no incident but the second, the 
destruction of Noriega’s Learjet parked at Punta Patilla airport, resulted in several 
causalities.  While crossing a tarmac the U.S. Navy SEALs were spotted and shot at by 
PDF members guarding the jet. Losing the element of surprise, the SEALs were 
completely exposed and suffered four deaths.  The operation destroyed the plane and 
prevented Noriega from being able to escape, but at the cost of four men.47  This incident 
angered Colin Powell and he highlighted it as one of the major errors in the conduct of 
Operation Just Cause.48  
 U.S. Air Force’s F-117 Nighthawks launched the first overt strike of Operation 
Just Cause.  Two of the high tech planes dropped two 2,000lb Paveway III bombs next 
to the Rio Hato Army Barracks prior to U.S. Army Rangers parachuting in to seize the 
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airfield.  The explosions would supposedly stun and disorient the sleeping Panamanian 
Defense Force soldiers.49  When the plans were being revised in October and November 
1989, Cheney questioned the request to use the F-117 stating, “The last time I checked 
there was no serious air defense threats.” General Thurman and Lieutenant General Carl 
Stiner, the XVIII Airborne Corps Commander planning the operation, argued that the F-
117s were needed because of their accuracy in dropping munitions.  Cheney gave his 
approval, but reduced the requested number of aircraft from six to two.50    
 With Operation Just Cause underway, the F-117s dropped their bombs.  The air 
strike failed.  First, the laser-guided bombs landed 300 meters off target. 51   Second, 
instead of stunning the soldiers, the bombs alerted them to the impending invasion.  
When the Rangers parachuted in, they were welcomed by anti-aircraft artillery and not 
the stunned defenders promised in the mission brief. 52   
 U.S. forces experienced some of the fiercest combat at Rio Hato.  The base had 
to be seized in order to prevent the Machos del Monte from heading to Panama City to 
support the Panamanian military or fleeing into the countryside to launch a guerilla 
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campaign.53 In addition to Rio Hato, U.S. paratroopers landed at the Torrijos-Tocumen 
Airport, in order to isolate Panama City.  Forces from U.S. military bases encircled and 
neutralized the Panamanian military headquarters at the Comandancia.54  Resistance 
vanished as combat quickly ended.  U.S. troops put into practice the lessons they had 
learned from two months of rehearsals and constant drilling.55   
 The campaign succeeded because it incapacitated the military leadership. 
Noriega had developed a contingency plan in case of an American invasion composed of 
three phases.  The first, it established a safe perimeter around the Comandancia in order 
to maintain command and control of military and paramilitary forces.  Second, it placed 
rodblocks to delay the movement of any U.S. forces.  Finally, Noriega planned to 
mobilize civilians and his paramilitary Dignity Battalions for large-scale protests.  The 
plan also called for attacks on three key American points, the U.S. ambassador’s 
residence, U.S. fuel storage sites around the country and Fort Clayton, the base he 
assessed a military invasion would be staged from.  Noriega intended to take a defensive 
position.  Meanwhile, his diplomats would seek international support and condemnation 
of the United States in the court of world opinion.56  The United States neutralized the 
plan completely as the Americans overwhelmed and isolated the Panamanian military 
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before any organized resistance could materialize.  On the morning of the first day of 
hostilities, resistance to the U.S. military evaporated.   
 At 7:00 a.m. on 20 December 1989 President Bush informed the nation of the 
invasion of Panama.  He justified the invasion in order “to protect the lives of American 
citizens in Panama and bring General Noriega to justice in the United States.”  He 
mentioned Noriega’s declaration of war against the United States, followed by the 
killing of Lieutenant Paz, and the attack on Lieutenant Curtis and his wife, as acts of 
aggression.  Bush also emphasized, “General Noriega's reckless threats and attacks upon 
Americans in Panama created an imminent danger to the 35,500 American citizens in 
Panama.”57     
 During the President’s address a question surfaced.  Should the U.S. military 
focus on searching for Noriega or pacifying the Panamanian military? General Thurman 
and the U.S. Southern Command staff decided that the Panamanian military presented a 
threat.  If it could be neutralized, than Noriega’s power base would vanish along with the 
threat to American citizens.  Lieutenant General Stiner surmised that “our operation the 
first night had been successful, and that even though we had not captured Noriega, the 
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PDF had in fact been neutralized.”58  Only after neutralizing the Panamanian military 
and ending the overt threat to American citizens did Operation Just Cause shift its focus 
to the capture of Noriega.   But where had he gone? 
 When the invasion began, Noriega had been at a military training camp near the 
Torrijos-Tocumen airport.59 In his memoir he claimed the invasion caught him by 
surprise but he still tried to organize military resistance.60 He never organized a 
resistance. Constantly on the move to avoid capture, he shuttled through a series of safe 
houses.61  As U.S. forces established checkpoints, Noriega’s freedom of movement 
became limited and he decided to seek asylum at a foreign embassy.  He preferred the 
Cuban or Nicaraguan embassy with hopes of being able to flee to Cuba and avoid arrest 
by the United States, but U.S. Southern Command planners had anticipated this and 
placed a security cordon around those two embassies.62  Both ambassadors filed protests, 
but the Americans ignored them and kept their positions to block an escape attempt by 
Noriega, violating the spirit of embassies inviolability. With limited options, Noriega 
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entered the Papal Nunciature, on 24 December.  Once it became known where Noriega 
had taken refuge, U.S. forces surrounded the Nunciature and tense diplomatic 
negotiations began while the Cable New Network (CNN) broadcast the farcical siege 
live.63  Noriega could not be forcefully removed without violating diplomatic protocol 
and the inviolability of embassies.  Therefore, the United States waited for him to either 
leave of his own volition or be expelled by the Papal legate, Monsignor Jose Sebastian 
Laboa.   
 The U.S. military setup a series of roadblocks to prevent large crowds from 
descending on the Nunciature and to ensure that Noriega did not escape.64 When 
negotiations began, U.S. Army Psychological Operations troops set up high-powered 
speakers around the Nunciature.  The speakers proceeded to blare loud rock music in an 
attempt to drive out Noriega.  News outlets picked up the story and reported that the 
speakers were a modern siege tactic.  The reality of the use of the loud music to drive 
Noriega out of the Nunciature is only partly true.  While U.S. and Vatican officials 
negotiated, journalists pointed parabolic microphones at them. General Thurman ordered 
that the microphones be disrupted so U.S. Army Psychological Operation troops played 
music.  Soon the orders became muddled and music blared at all hours in the hopes of 
driving Noriega out. 65   The attempt at psychological warfare backfired and the 
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Monsignor politely asked for the music to be stopped since it only bothered him and his 
staff.  Noriega seems to have enjoyed the music.66  
 Besides the embarrassment of playing too much AC/DC, negotiations dragged 
on.  The Bush Administration remained in contact with the Vatican and the President 
spoke directly to Pope John Paul II to reassure the pontiff that Noriega would be given a 
fair trial in the United States.67  Monsignor Laboa urged Noriega to surrender.68  On 3 
January 1990 after ten days in the Nunciature, Noriega walked out.  The U.S. military 
seized him and then placed him in the custody of two DEA agents at Howard Air Force 
Base, who flew him to Miami to stand trial. 69    
 The reconstruction phase of military operations began almost immediately.  
Operation Promote Liberty, the phase’s new name, however, had serious problems.70 
While the U.S. military never lost civil authority there had been incidents of looting 
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early in the invasion.71  U.S. military planners had anticipated this possibility but 
decided that seizing military objectives and neutralizing the Panamanian Defense Forces 
was more important.  Their planning accepted some disorder in the country.72  The lack 
of preparation for Promote Liberty led to major flaws in reconstruction operations.  
General Thurman conceded, “I did not even spend five minutes on [Promote Liberty] 
during my briefing as the incoming CINCSO in August” since “the least of my problems 
at the time was [Promote Liberty] …we put together the campaign for Just Cause and 
probably did not spend enough time on the restoration.” General Thurman concluded, 
“The chaotic aftermath of the 1989 US invasion of Panama . . . a decapitated 
government initially incapable of managing basic governmental functions, a sizable 
refugee problem, and a widespread lapse in civil law and order all threatened to mock 
the attainment of the operation’s stated objectives.” The setbacks from the reconstruction 
efforts in Panama were met with widespread condemnation and carried over into 
critiques of the invasion. 73 
 In an effort to win support for the invasion, President Bush and Vice-President 
Dan Quayle called the presidents of Latin American countries to justify the invasion and 
                                                
71 Richard Shultz, In the Aftermath of War (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 
1993), 55.  
72 Oral History Interview of COL Michael G Snell Commander SOUTHCOM 
Operations section (J-3) Joint Task Force South; XVIII Airborne Corps Historian oral 
history collection conducted 1990 in the Headquarters of the 3d Battalion, 504th 
Infantry, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, by Robert K. Wright, Jr., Historian, XVIII 
Airborne Corps. 
73 Shultz, In the Aftermath of War, 16. 
   109 
keep them informed on the situation.  Many rebuked President Bush.  President Carlos 
Andres Perez of Venezuela told him, “We are upset about the reason you are calling.”  
He went on to say after listening to the reasoning, “I knew that it would end this way.”  
Perez expressed disappointment that the situation could not have been resolved 
peacefully. But, he promised, “to soften the reaction [of other Latin American leaders] as 
much as possible” and assist in the recognition of the new Endara government.74   Others 
were not as supportive.  President Carlos Salinas de Gortari of Mexico said, “I have 
repeatedly spoken out against Mr. Noriega.  Nevertheless, this action rebels against our 
principles.”  He criticized Bush for having used military force, but allowed that Mexico 
would recognize the Endara government.75  The presidents of several other Latin 
American nations accepted the reasoning for the invasion during conversations with the 
U.S. President and Vice President, but they publicly condemned the invasion.  
 The OAS proposed a resolution condemning the invasion on 22 December.  
Luigi Einaudi, the U.S. ambassador to the OAS, said that the United States “acted in 
Panama for legitimate reasons of self-defense, and to protect the integrity of the Panama 
Canal treaties.”  He argued that the actions conformed “with Article 51 of the UN 
charter, Article 21 of the Charter of the Organization of American States and the 
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provisions of the Panama Canal Treaties.”  Besides defending the invasion’s legality the 
ambassador condemned the OAS because it “was unable to do anything about Noriega’s 
scandalous and bloody rape of the Panamanian elections of May 7.”  He concluded, “It is 
time that this organization welcomed Noriega’s departure, just as the world has in the 
past welcomed the departure of Somoza, Duvalier, Marcos and more recently Honecker, 
Zhivkov and Husak.”76  Despite the speech, the OAS condemned the U.S. invasion of 
Panama by a margin of 20 to 1. Only the U.S. voted against the resolution and Canada 
abstained.77  
 The United Nations Security Council also condemned the invasion as a violation 
of international law. Thomas Pickering, the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, 
defended American actions in a speech before the general assembly.  He invoked Article 
51 of the UN charter and said “U.S. forces exercised their inherent right of self defense 
under international law by taking action in Panama in response to armed attacks by 
forces under the direction of Manuel Noriega.”  He added, “The action is designed to 
protect American lives as well as to fulfill the obligations of the United States to defend 
the integrity of the Panama Canal Treaties.”  A vote was put forth to the Genreal 
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Assembly, and similar to the OAS, the vote went against the United States.  There were 
not enough votes for a motion to be carried.78  
 In the United States the American public reacted positively to Operation Just 
Cause.  A Gallup-Newsweek poll, taken on 21 December 1981, showed 80 percent of 
the American public approved the use of military force in Panama.   The Administration 
received strong bipartisan support.79  On 7 February 1990 the U.S. House of 
Representatives passed a resolution that declared President Bush had handled the 
invasion of Panama “decisively and appropriately” only after “efforts to resolve the 
crisis in Panama by political, economic and diplomatic means” had been exhausted.  But 
it warned, “Panama was a response to a unique set of circumstances.”80  Indeed, Panama 
was unique.  The United States would not be likely to ever again have half the invasion 
force already inside a country it is attacking, and would not be able to rehearse seizing 
objectives for two months. 
 Launching a large scale military operation because of the death of one soldier, 
the wounding of another and the harassment and assaults against an officer and his wife 
may seem extreme, but Operation Just Cause needs to be evaluated in the context of the 
large American presence in Panama.  As the situation in Panama worsened an ongoing 
                                                
78 Paul Lewis, “Fighting in Panama: United Nations; Security Council Condemnation of 
Invasion Vetoed,” New York Times, December 24, 1989. 
79 Cramer, “‘Just Cause’ or Just Politics,” 178. 
80 Expressing the sense of Congress concerning Operation Just Cause in Panama, H.R. 
Res.,  262, 101st Cong. (1990). 
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concern was the safety of American citizens.  The population at the time of the invasion 
numbered 35,500.  Prior to the May elections it stood at 51,305, giving Panama the 
fourth largest population of expatriate Americans after, West Germany, the United 
Kingdom, and Japan.81  Americans represented over 2 percent of the population and 
were concentrated near Panama City and Colón.82  There had already been 906 incidents 
of harassment against American citizens at the time the Panamanian military killed 
Lieutenant Paz.83  These incidents were part of Noriega’s organized harassment 
campaign meant to pressure Washington.84 President Bush had seen how the Iran 
Hostage Crisis eroded confidence in the Carter Administration and the United States.  
He was concerned Noriega would begin taking more hostages.85 After 16 December 
1989, military force remained the only course of action available to the U.S. President. 
In past instances of U.S. direct military interventions, from China during the 
Boxer Rebellion in 1900 to Grenada during Operation Urgent Fury in 1983, the United 
States invoked the need to protect American lives.  Panama, however, presented a rare 
                                                
81 U.S. Census, 1990: Census of Population: General Population Characteristics United 
States, Department of Defense Estimate of Americans in Panama, (Washington, D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, 1990).  
82 The 1989 CIA World Fact Book lists the population of Panama at 2,373,053.  The 
total number of Americans in Panama on 20 December 1989 was 35,500.  
83 De Mena, Soldiering in Panama, 7. 
84 CIA report, “The Harassment of U.S. Personnel in Panama: Patterns and Objectives,” 
March 13, 1989, Panama [9], OA/ID CF00741-022, Directorate of Intelligence, Nicholas 
Rostow Files, National Security Council, Bush Presidential Records, GBPL. 
85 Cole, Operation Just Cause, 49. 
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case because of the large presence of American citizens in the country.  As President 
Bush emphatically stated to the American people during the announcement of the 
invasion, “General Noriega's reckless threats and attacks upon Americans in Panama 
created an imminent danger to the 35,500 American citizens in Panama.”86 Operation 
Just Cause represented a prudent response to a genuine threat.  Based on events over the 
previous year, had President Bush not acted he faced a deteriorating situation that risked 
the lives of thousands of American citizens.  
The use of military force then did not represent American strength.  It 
represented weakness.  Political, economic and diplomatic pressure by the United States 
did not convince Noriega to step down from power.  Instead this pressure provoked him 
to attack American citizens. Ultimately, resulting in the death of an American 
serviceman, the assault of three others and the sexual assault of a civilian dependent.  
These attacks indicated a possible escalation of violence.  
                                                
86George H. W. Bush, “Address to the Nation on Panama” (televised address, 
Wachington D.C., 20 December 1989) <http://millercenter.org/president/ 
speeches/detail/3422> accessed 25 November 2011. 
   114 
CHAPTER VI  
CONCLUSION 
Visitors to the George H. W. Bush Presidential Museum are presented with 
exhibits that range from a mockup of the Oval Office to a section on the family dog, 
Millie.  The focus is on the events of the four years of the Bush Presidency, including an 
imposing section on the end of the Cold War, the fall of the Berlin Wall, and the collapse 
of communism in Eastern Europe. Almost immediately after this monumental display, 
an even more imposing exhibit on Operation Desert Storm introduces the visitor to the 
showdown in the Persian Gulf.  Tucked between these two large exhibits, a sharp-eyed 
patron might notice a tiny display case with handcuffs and a mug shot of General 
Manuel Antonio Noriega.  The insignificant exhibit is the museum’s only reference to 
the 1989 invasion of Panama.  Memory of “Operation Just Cause” began to fade almost 
immediately in the Bush Presidency.   
When President Bush and his staff wrote the 1990 State of the Union Address a 
month after the invasion, the first draft made no mention of Operation Just Cause.  It 
focused on events in Eastern Europe and the rollback of Soviet hegemony.  A staffer 
wrote on the draft that it would be “unacceptable” to not mention the invasion of Panama 
since “23 American lost their lives in the conflict.” 1  The second draft made a passing 
reference to Operation Just Cause, at the very end of the speech.  Staffers again deemed 
                                                
1 State of the Union 1st Draft, 1st Draft NSC comments, S320-90 12852622 [6], 1990 
State of the Union, January 22, 1990, White House Office of Record Management (here 
after WHORM), Bush Presidential Records, GBPL. 
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this “unacceptable.”2   The third draft increased the importance of Panama by being the 
first major event the president discussed.  In the speech, Operation Just Cause came 
before Solidarity’s electoral victories in Poland, free elections in Czechoslovakia, and 
even the fall of the Berlin Wall. At the conclusion, though, the speech declared an “end 
to hostilities in Panama,” the “termination of Operation Just Cause,” and "a complete 
withdrawal of all US troops” in Panama.3  In the fourth and final draft, the language 
changed again and Operation Just Cause was declared to have to "achieved its 
objective."4  The change emphasized the success of military operations, but also the need 
for a continued U.S. military commitment to Panama for the foreseeable future.5      
Despite such strong language, the American commitment soon faltered.  The 
United States shifted its attention to other issues and areas of the globe.  Though Bush’s 
State of the Union address positioned Panama as the most pressing event of 1989, 
history and Bush’s museum show that the Administration was far more concerned with 
the end of the Cold War and helping Eastern Europe embrace capitalism and 
                                                
2 State of the Union 2nd Draft, 2nd Draft NSC comments, S320-90 12852622 [6], 1990 
State of the Union, January 22, 1990, WHORM, Bush Presidential Records, GBPL. 
3 State of the Union 3rd Draft, 3rd Draft NSC comments, S320-90 12852622 [6], 1990 
State of the Union, January 22, 1990, WHORM, Bush Presidential Records, GBPL. 
4 Inserts for State of the Union With Staff Comments, S320-90 12852622 [6], 1990 State 
of the Union, January 22, 1990, WHORM, Bush Presidential Records, GBPL. 
5 Operation Just Cause was the name for the combat phase of operations, which had been 
terminated at the time of the State of the Union; Operation Promote Liberty was being 
carried out at the time.  The statement was changed to avoid confusion. 
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democracy.6  The invasion of Kuwait by Saddam Hussein and subsequent Persian Gulf 
War eight months later displaced Operation Just Cause as the major U.S. military 
engagement in the post-Vietnam era.7   
The Panamanian economy had been moribund prior to the invasion, due to 
sanctions imposed by EO 12635.  The Bush Administration promised Panama $1 billion 
in rebuilding funds to repair damages from the invasion, but Congress only gave $500 
million to Panama, with the other half being earmarked for Nicaragua.8  The lingering 
economic challenges facing Panama created a difficult position for the newly installed 
government.   
During the attack, Guelliermo Endara, the projected winner of the May 1989 
elections, was sworn in as President of Panama and became head of state. His challenges 
included having to fend off a coup in 1991, rebuilding of Panama’s economy, and 
repairing the damage from the invasion.  When new elections were held in 1994, Jimmy 
Carter returned to Panama to again serve as an election monitor for the National 
Democratic Institute.  Endara lost, but relinquished power gracefully. The election 
                                                
6 In their book A World Transformed (New York, Random House, 1999), President Bush 
and his National Security Advisor Lieutenant General Brent Scowcroft offer an account 
of their foreign policy decisions.  The book focuses primarily on the Soviet Union, 
Easten Europe, China and Desert Storm.  They make a few passing references to Panama 
and do not discuss Operation Just Cause in any depth.  
7 Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, The General’s War: The Inside Story of 
the Conflict in the Gulf  (New York: Back Bay Books, 1995), 15.  
8 Fact Sheet, “Partnership with Panama: Action Plan to Foster Economic Recovery,” 
Panama (2) [1 of 3], OA/ID CF 01082, Eric Melby Files, National Security Council, 
Bush Presidential Records, GBPL. 
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procedures and results pleased Carter. When asked if he would return to Panama he said, 
“Yeah in 1999,” for the next presidential election and the handover of the Canal.9  This 
was one of the positive aspects of the invasion. Though fragile, democracy, rule of law, 
and more importantly the peaceful transitions of governments took hold in Panama. 
The handover of the Canal loomed as the major event facing the United States 
and Panama during the 1990s.  The Bush Administration had considered delaying the 
hand-over procedures during Noriega’s time in power.  This never occurred and Panama 
took on a larger role managing the Canal. In September 1990, Gilberto Guardia Fabréga 
became the first permanent Panamanian administrator of the Canal Commission, 
responsible for the operation and maintenance of the Canal.  This move signaled a 
commitment on the part of both nations to the turn over.10  Since then Panama’s 
successful operation has increased revenues and more ships have transited the Canal.11  
After centuries of outside powers controlling the region, starting in 2000 Panama finally 
enjoyed the benefits of its location.  While the transfer of the Canal progressed 
smoothly, the negotiations for U.S. military bases faltered.  
The Bush and Endara Administrations planned to negotiate an extension of U.S. 
military bases during their respective second terms, in order to avoid the perception that 
                                                
9 Brinkley, The Unfinished Presidency, 294-295. 
10 Conniff, Panama and the United States, 161. 
11 Maurer and Yu, The Big Ditch, 314. 
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the United States had placed Endara in power in return for military bases.12  Both men 
lost their reelection bids and their successors did not reach an agreement.  A 
Congressional report from 1997 stated “The likelihood of reaching any agreement to 
keep a continued U.S. military presence beyond the year 2000 in Panama is diminishing 
more each day.” 13 The fact that the United States negotiated an extension for military 
bases and sought to avoid the perception of a quid pro quo for bases shows another 
shortcoming of the puppet narrative.  The United States acknowledged Latin American 
sovereignty and did not merely take whatever it wanted.   
As negotiations stalled, American citizens departed in growing numbers.  
Between May and December 1989, the United States evacuated 15,805 nonessential 
American citizens from Panama.  Though this relocation was meant to be temporary, the 
majority never returned.  The level of permanent military personnel in 1992 remained at 
the pre-invasion level of 10,800.  By 1995 only 6,800 military personnel remained.  In 
1997 U.S. Southern Command moved its Headquarters to Miami, which dropped the 
number of Americans in Panama to 2,390.14  In 1999, the last year of a formal U.S. 
military presence, only 658 American citizens remained at Howard AFB, the last US 
military base in Panama.  Their mission supported the “forward-based” counter narcotic 
                                                
12 Ibid.,180. 
13 Future of U.S. Military Presence in Panama: A Staff Report to the committee on 
Foreign Relations of the United States Senate, S. Rep. No. 106-35 (1997), 1. 
14 Future of U.S. Military Presence in Panama A Staff Report to the committee on 
Foreign Relations of the United States Senate, S. Rep. 106-35 (1997), 1. 
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air-operations.15  By 31 December 1999 the personnel at Howard AFB departed and the 
large-scale presence of American citizens ended.  After 1999 only the Smithsonian 
Tropical Research Institution remained, with a permanent staff of 40 scientists.16  
Considering that at its height the population of American citizens residing in Panama 
reached 62,234, the reduction to a mere 40 was a drastic change.17  
 The legacy of the United States in Panama, like Operation Just Cause, has faded.  
It is telling that the Department of Defense did not issue a formal campaign medal for 
Operation Just Cause.  The U.S. military itself has limited the strategic importance of 
Operation Just Cause by focusing on the tactical use of force.  By limiting the conflict to 
solely be about capturing a dictator the military has reinforced the historical scholarship 
that favors a narrative of the United States creating and retiring puppets in Latin 
America at will.  Yet the long history of the United States in Panama reveals a very 
different reason why the Bush Administration pursued its “Just Cause.”  The invasion 
was not about sustaining American hegemony, changing puppets, or reverting to Big 
Stick foreign policy.  The Bush Administration invaded to protect American citizens 
                                                
15 Staff Report on Post-1999 U.S. Security and counter-drug interests in Panama, H.R. 
Rep. No. 106-803 (1999), 6. 
16 The Smithsonian Tropical Research Institute accessed 10 August 2014 
<http://www.stri.si.edu/english/scientific_staff/index.php> accessed 11 December 2011 
17 U.S. Census, 1970: General Population Characteristics United States (Washington, 
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1970).Though there are Americans expatriates and 
retirees living in Panama, these American citizens are living there of their own volition 
and not part of an official U.S. presence.  
   120 
during a critical transition that marked the end of one hundred and fifty years of 
Americans in Panama.    
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